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Privacy on the Open Road
PROFESSOR DOROTHY J. GLANCY'

I. INTRODUCTION

At a time when enhancement in surveillance technology appears to be
matched by the will to use them, I it may seem odd to discuss privacy on the
open road. But United States law does recognize privacy protections, notwithstanding both the advent of sophisticated surveillance technologies as well as
rejection by some of the very idea of any expectation of privacy on the open
road. 2 Along the roads and highways of the United States, people traveling
from place to place continue to act like they expect a certain degree of
privacy. 3 These, perhaps naive, expectations of privacy are a persistent reality

* Dorothy J. Glancy, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., Wellesley
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Center for
Science, Technology and Society at Santa Clara University.
1. E.g., USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 200 1), Pub. L. No.1 07-56, 115 Stat.
272 (200 I), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, 117
Stat. 2599 (2003).
2. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist bluntly stated twenty years ago that, "A person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). More recently, even Justice
Rehnquistjoined in the Court's unanimous decision in lllinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 891 (2004), that
holds roadblock and checkpoint stops are seizures for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Activities of drivers in their vehicles - from teeth flossing, to eating, kissing, dressing and
undressing, not to mention the ever-popular nose-picking - often seem to reflect expectations that vehicles
are private spheres. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ALoNG FOR THE RIDE:
REDUCING DRIVER DISTRACTIONS (2002); LEON JAMES, DATA ON THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE DRIVER IN
TRAFFIC: AFFECTIVE, COGNmVE, AND SENSORIMOTOR (1984), at http://www.soc.hawaii.edui/leonjlleonjl
leonpsy/instructor/drivingl.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). Among the many amusing and frightening
newspaper accounts of private behavior in automobiles are: Katie Kerwin McCrimmon, Driven to
295
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despite ever-expanding "automobile exceptions" to federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and court decisions
upholding traffic stops. Indeed, lawyers and judges may be more surprised
than ordinary people to learn just how many legal protections there are for
privacy rights of people on public roads and highways.
These controversial privacy rights on the open road take on added
importance as modem surveillance technologies make keeping track of people
on public roadways relatively cheap and easy. Roadway surveillance has
become nearly ubiquitous, as an array of new technologies, such as Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), make possible pervasive, and often covert,
tracking of travelers along roads and highways throughout the United States.
Some of these ITS systems are designed to collect information about overall
transportation patterns and traffic flows. But others, such as automatic vehicle
identification (AVI), can target and track specific vehicles and the individuals
in them. The ITS archived data user service (ADUS) has the potential to
maintain records of where an individual has been in monitored areas. 4 These
ITS technologies can pinpoint where a person is. They can connect that location with other records, such as where that person has been in the past. They
can even be used to predict the person's future movements and locations.
What is unprecedented about ITS technologies is the scale at which they
operate. In part because of funding by the federal government, 5 they are
almost everywhere. Management of such omnipresent roadway surveillance
systems so that they do not interfere with privacy rights poses a major.
challenge to ITS and ITS operators.
Just as ITS and other surveillance tools focusing on roads and highways
have become more widely available, concerns about homeland security,
thwarting potential terrorist attacks and combating antisocial behavior have
stimulated government demand for and use of such on-the-road information
for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. Finding and keeping track of
potential threats to public order are increasingly important issues. At the same
time, in the private sector, real-time and historical information about a

Distraction, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 3, 2002, at 3D; Aly Sujo, Most Drivers Shred Rules of Road,
NEW YORK POST, May 28, 2003, at 30; The 7 Car·dinal Sins of the Daily Commute, THE SHEBOYGAN
PRESS, Nov. 21, 2002, at lC.
4. A VI and ADUS are types of ITS systems discussed, infra notes 27-33.
5. Federal ITS funding for Fiscal Year 2004 will amount to $232 million, according to the
Intelligent Transportation Society of America, at http://www.itsa.orglitsnews.nsf/0/ebbdfa05db4142
dd85256de9007454a8 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). All ITS funding since the program's inception in 1991
amounts to an estimated 80.9 billion dollars in capital costs. MELVYN CHESLOW & BARBARA L. STAPLES,
NATIONAL COSTS OFTHEMETROPOLITAN ITS lNFRASTRucrURE:UPDATEDWITH 2002D EPLOYMENTDATA
3RD REVISION, at 20, Table 3-7, (Dep't of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program
Office, Working Paper No. FHWA-OP-03-178, 2(03).
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person's travel patterns is extremely valuable to "location" marketers and to
those engaged in geodemographic6 marketing of products and services. As
Thomas Friedman has suggested, privacy rights can be threatened not only by
1984' s "Big Brother"-George Orwell's image of an omnipresent totalitarian
governmene-but also by "little brother," the private-sector information
collector. 8 On public roadways, it seems like Big Brother is accompanied by
a gang oflittle brothers, none of whom has any respect for individual privacy.
Actually, there are three potential categories of users of information about
people on roads and highways: two types of government agencies, in the form
oflaw enforcement and civil transportation authorities, as well as a variety of
private-sector marketing and advertising companies. With apologies both to
Orwell and to Friedman, one might call these minders of roadway information
Big Brother (law enforcement and intelligence agencies), Big Sister (civil
transportation authorities) and a heterogenous band of little brothers (privatesector entities such as advertisers, insurers, vehicle manufacturers and the
like).
When these three types of roadway information mavens get together to
collect and to share surveillance information about the location and travel
patterns of individuals, privacy seems at great risk. The Department of
Defense's infamous "Total Information Awareness," later reconstituted as
"Terrorism Iilformation Awareness,,,9 caused public uproar because of fears
that privacy would be compromised by combining government and private
information sources. Continuing controversies over the Matrix (Multi state
Antiterrorism Information Exchange) program lO and the Transportation
Security Agency's CAPPS III I reflect general uneasiness about "data mining"

6. See Jon Goss, "We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live": The Instrumental
Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 EcON. GEOGRAPHY 171 (Apr. 1995).
7. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949).
8. Thomas L Friedman, Little Brother, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 1999, § 4, at 17; Thomas L
Friedman, The Hackers' Lessons, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 15,2000, at A27.
9. See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECfS AGENCY (DARPA), REPORT TO CONGRESS
REGARDING THE TERRORJSM lNFORMAnON AWARENESS PROGRAM, (May 20, 2003). Congress eventually
voted to de-fund the program in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004. Carl Hulse,
Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A20.
10. Jane Black, One More Slapata Prying Eye, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2004. Apparently only
Florida, Michigan, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio continue to cooperate with the program. John
Schwartz, Privacy Fears Erode Suppon for a Network to Fight Crime, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. IS, 2004, at C 1.
11. CAPPS II is an updated version of the existing airport screening program, Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System. Richard Behar, Never Heard ofAcxiom? Chances Are It's Heard of You,
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 140. Concerns about the privacy of screening information has caused repeated
delays in the launch of CAPPS II. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Privacy Issue Delays Change in Airpon
Screening System, N.Y. TiMES, Feb.l3, 2004, at A21. Dan Verton, Airline Passenger Screening System
Faces Deployment Delays: Unauthorized Access Possible, GAO Says, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 16,2004,
at 7.
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and collaboration between government and private databases containing
personal information about the locations and travel patterns of individuals.
Privacy expectations on the part of people on public roadways may be at
the outer limits of legally protected privacy rights, particularly when Federal
Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are at issue.
These days, in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, privacy rights on
a public road rarely seem to be found "reasonable,,12 or "justifiable,,13 or
"legitimate" 14 much less, all three. 15 But rarely does not mean never. In fact,
the United States Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that stopping
vehicles on public roads is a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 16
Even though the United States Supreme Court insisted in Katz v. United
States, 17 that the privacy guarantee of the Fourth Amendment "protects people,
not places,,,18 expectations of privacy in some places, such as a person's
home,19 seem to be more intuitively obvious than expectations of privacy in

12. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) initiated reasonableness tenninology in connection with decisions
whether a search has taken place. [d.
13. "Justifiable" was the chosen privacy-expectation modifier in the plurality opinion in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which also used ''reasonable'' and "legitimate" as adjectives. See also
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602. 616-17 (1989).
14. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322. 336 (1973) (discussing the legitimacy of privacy
expectations). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001).
15. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 315 (1987). There are. of course, critics of reasonable
expectations of privacy analysis. Perhaps the most acerbic is Justice Scalia. Concurring in Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), a case in which the United States Supreme Court refused to suppress narcotics
evidence against visitors to an apartment that was searched without a warrant. Justice Scalia complained
that the ''reasonable expectation of privacy" test lacks any "plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth
Amendment." and is also "self-indulgent." [d. at 97 (Scalia, J .• concurring). "[U]nsurprisingly, those
'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" he
scoffed. "bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable." [d. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting in part Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347. 361 (1967».
See discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy. infra notes 116-29.
16. Dlinois v. Lidster. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The place involved in Katz was a public phone booth. [d. at 348. The
Court noted, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." [d. at 351.
19. "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silvennan v. United States, 365 U.S.
505,511 (1961). In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), a case involving infrared monitoring of
a home. Justice Scalia writing for the majority put the matter somewhat more directly by stating. "With few
exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must
be answered no." [d. at 31.
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other, more public places, such as roads and highways. But that does not
mean that expectations of privacy on public roadways are worthy of no legal
protection at all. When courts and legislatures recognize privacy rights on
public roads and highways, usually the circumstances, such as the procedural
context and the facts at issue, are unusual. Moreover, when decision makers
decide to protect privacy on the open road, they usually express particular
concern about the societal consequences of failing to protect privacy in this
setting. Admittedly, highways typically present unusually "hard cases" for
protecting privacy on the open road. 20 It is those hard cases, where privacy
protections are perhaps least expected, that are the focus of this exploration
of privacy on the open road.
The discussion begins by describing some of the surveillance techniques
and technologies that can affect the privacy of travelers along public
roadways. Then the article turns to examine some of the privacy interests of
people on the open road. The next part considers some of the many types of
legal rights that protect the privacy of people on public roads or highways.
The article concludes by addressing the principle that people on the open road
have important rights to freedom from intrusions and interferences with their
on-the-road activities.
II. TRACKING TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES

Watching people travel on public roads is often described as "fair
game,,,21 an age-old pastime for anyone who wants to look at the passing
scene. 22 Indeed, people tracking other people as they move from place to

20. The concept of "hard cases" comes from RONAlD DWORKIN, TAKING RlGIITS SERIOUSLY 81- 130
(1977).
21. There are, of course, instances of illegal stalking - actively following someone in a manner to
cause fear. The crime of stalking is discussed infra note 208.
22. For example, one of Edgar Allan Poe's most enigmatic stories is The Man o/the Crowd from
his TALES OF THE GROTESQUE AND ARABESQUE (1840). In Poe's story, an anonymous observer/voyeur
describes how he became fascinated by an elderly man with "a countenance which at once arrested and
absorbed my whole attention, on account of the absolute idiosyncracy of its expression." In the end, the
observer concludes that the old man is ''the type and the genius of deep crime. He refuses to be alone. He
is the man of the crowd. It will be in vain to follow, for I shallleam no more of him, nor of his deeds."
EDGAR ALLAN POE, COLLECTED WORKS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE, 506, 515 (T.O. Mabbott, ed., Belknap
Press, 1969) (emphasis added).
Examples of current books about people-watching range from Dr. Aaron W. Wolfgang's
EVER YBODY' S GUIDE TO PEOPLE WATCHING (1995) to ROUTE 66: THE HIGHWAY AND ITS PEoPLE (1988)
by Susan C. Kelly and Quinta Scott. The popularity of webcarns and reality video also reflects the human
fascination with watching other humans.
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place seems to be about as old as humanity.23 Even non-human animals track
other animals, often seeking to prey on them. 24
There are many ways to keep track of a person (a target, in surveillance
terms) as he or she moves about in the physical world. Having other people
physically follow a targeted individual wherever the latter goes is one, fairly
low-tech, way of tracking a targeted person. 25 Investigators sometimes call
this type of visual surveillance "tailing" or "shadowing." But such physical
following has practical drawbacks, in addition to its intrusion on the privacy
of the person being followed. First, physical surveillance is expensive in
terms of person-time, usually requiring at least one follower (often several
followers) for each person being followed. Second, once the person being
followed realizes that she is being followed, she usually reacts by either
eluding or attacking her trackers. On top of these logistical problems, keeping
track of both the present and all of the past locations of a tracked person in
readily retrievable and interrelateable form can pose significant informationmanagement challenges. These practical problems tend to limit the use of
physical surveillance to very few targets.
Advances in technology now make it possible to target and track many
more people-in fact, nearly everyone on a road or highway. New surveillance technologies greatly expand capacities to keep track of large numbers
of people both in real time and historically over time. 26 Several attributes of

23. H.T. Bunn & E.M. Kroll, Systematic Butchery by Plio/Pleistocene Hominidsat Olduvai Gorge,
Tanzania, 27 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 431-52 (1986); RICHARD B. LEE & IRVEN DEVORE, MAN THE
HUNTER (1969); ROBERT w. SUSSMAN, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1998);
LAURA BETZIG, HUMAN NATURE: A HUMAN EVOLUTION 329 (1989); J.D. Speth, Early Hominid Hunting
and Scavenging, 18 JOURNAL OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 329 (1989). Cf Craig. B. Stanford, Chimpanzee
Hunting Behavior and Human Evolution, AMERICAN SCIENTIST (May-June 1995).
24. Among the species most closely studied for their hunting patterns are Chimpanzees. Stanford,
supra note 23.
25. Nineteenth century Native Americans were famous for their tracking skills. Kenneth W Porter,
The Seminole-Negro Indian Scout, 1870-1881,55 Sw. HIST. Q. 358 (1951). The legendary Apache Scouts
may have been among the most expert trackers in American history. See Eve Ball, The Apache Scouts: A
Circicahua Appraisal, 7 ARIZ. & THE WEST 315 (1965).
26. Technologies that project surveillance in unseen and unanticipated ways have long concerned
the courts. For example, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
(2001) held that thermal radiation scanning (a "technological enhancement or ordinary perception") of a
home from a public street constitutes an unreasonable search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
His opinion for the Court concludes by stating, "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical 'intrusion' ... constitutes a search" under Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).ld.
at 34. Justice Scalia explained that when "the technology in question is not in general public use," it is
necessary to treat its use as a search. [d. After all, "preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" is what is at stake. [d. His concern
was, of course, not about roadways but about leaving "the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
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modem roadway surveillance technologies enhance their effectiveness. First,
many of the new surveillance technologies tend to be discrete to the point of
virtual invisibility, so that people tracked by them usually have no way of
knowing that they are being tracked. Second, use of these surveillance
technologies is widespread. In part because of federal funding for Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), United States roads and highways are
increasingly covered by traffic surveillance. 27 Third, the emphasis on
nationwide interoperability of ITS surveillance systems, together with use of
digital formats for data collection, make roadway surveillance information
widely available, interchangeable and manipulable through searchable
relational databases. Some of these databases contain real-time location
information. Some databases are historical-retaining archives of the times
and places of past travel patterns. Others are used to model and predict future
travel. Fourth, because digital location data is often cheaper to retain than to
edit or to destroy, roadway surveillance information may be kept indefinitely.
In the near future, ITS systems will potentially be able to collect information
everywhere about everybody's and anybody's whereabouts all the time.
Some of the legal restrictions on use of these high-tech tracking systems
will be the focus of Part N. At this point, it is important to consider some of
the many types of modem surveillance technologies that can be deployed
along roads and highways both by ITS systems and private-sector entities, as
well as by law enforcement.
Intelligent Transportation Systems
Much of the ITS infrastructure is funded and managed by government
transportation agencies-mostly at the regional or local level-with funding
coming primarily from the United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT).28 In operation, ITS systems comprise a wide array of both public
and private projects, as well as public-private partnerships. On occasion, law
enforcement agencies participate in particular ITS projects; but law enforcement is virtually never the lead agency that manages such projects.
ITS technologies are beginning to make pervasive electronic surveillance
of people along roads and highways a reality. They include various types of
two-way transponders, remote cameras, license plate readers, as well as

technology." [d. at 35. This article suggests that there should be similar concerns about leaving people on
roads and highways "at the mercy of advancing technology," in the form of the new types of surveillance
technology discussed in this article.
27. An estimated 80.9 billion dollars in capital costs have been invested in ITS systems since these
systems were launched as part of ISTEA 1991. CHESLOW & STAPLES, supra note 5.
28. Within US DOT, ITS projects are usually managed through the Joint Program Office for
Intelligent Transportation Systems.
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diagnostic systems and location devices that keep track of the movement and
locations of wireless communications and the wireless devices themselves.
When two-way telecommunications devices are built into a vehicle, such
systems are called telematics. Other types of wireless communication devices,
such as cellular telephones, data messaging systems and personal digital
assistants, although not integrated into vehicles, can nonetheless be.used to
keep track of a person's location both in real time and on an historical basis.
Together, these technologies can relentlessly track almost anyone or anything
that moves on public roads and highways.
As a general matter, ITS does not always or necessarily involve roadway
surveillance. 29 Originally called Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems
(NHS), ITS technologies were initially designed to be impersonal, in that they
focused on anonymous vehicles in relationship with highways, rather than on
identifiable individuals in vehicles or along roadways.3o
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), primarily
through the Federal Highway Administration, has provided billions of dollars
of funding for ITS projects. But USDOT generally does not micromanage
particular ITS systems much less encourage targeted surveillance. The ITS
Joint Program Office within USDOT is currently in charge of most ITS
matters for USDOT.
On-the-ground ITS projects are typically under the control of local or
regional transportation authorities. Sometimes these local or regional
agencies partner with other public agencies, including law enforcement, as
well as private companies. The TravInfo ITS project in the San Francisco Bay
Area is typical. It is a joint project of the region's Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), CalTrans (the California state department of transportation) and the California Highway Patrol. 3l A private-sector company, PB
Farradyne, Inc. designed and manages TravInfo for the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission and its partners. 32 The purpose of the TravInfo
ITS project is to gather and provide traffic information in the San Francisco

29. The range of ITS activities is suggested by the 33 types of technologies, divided into eight user
services, bundles included within the National ITS Architecture (Version 5.0, April 2004), at
http://www.its.dot.gov/archlarch.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). For a complete listing ofthe 33 types of
technologies see Version 5.0 of the National ITS Architecture, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtmll
user/userserv.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
30. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, II SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. lSI (1995). This study considered an earlier version of ITS architecture
which was somewhat less involved in surveillance.
31. See the Metropolitan Transportation Commission website, at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/projectsl
travinfo/travinfl.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004); 511 Traffic website, at http://traffic.511.0rgltraffic_
partners.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
32. See press release regarding the TravInfo project on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission
website, at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/whats_happeninglpress_releaseslrell07.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
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Bay area with a view toward improving transportation efficiency, reducing
environmental consequences of congestion and promoting highway safety.
Initially ITS surveillance technologies collected aggregate information
about traffic flows, such as the rate of use of a segment of highway or of an
on-ramp or off-ramp to a bridge or tunnel, rather than personal data related to
a particular traveler or vehicle. However, over time, as ITS programs began
to focus increasingly on transportation users and their personal activities, a
greater emphasis on targeting individuals began to emerge. Today a number
of ITS technologies collect and manage individualized location information
and origin-destination data, such as the commute pattern of a person traveling
from her home to her workplace and back. Although surveillance of
individuals is nowhere listed as an ITS function or user service, many ITS
technologies focus on individual travelers' activities and locations. ITS
applications can track the locations a traveler visits and maintain itineraries
of an individual's past travel. These applications, and the data collected by
them, are sometimes even used to predict the individual's future movements
and activities. 33

33. More than half of the 33 ITS user services appear to contemplate collection of data about
identifiable individuals. These user services include:
I. Travel And Traffic Management User Services
1.1 Pre-trip Travellnfonnation
1.2 En-route Driver Infonnation
1.3 Route Guidance
1.4 Ride Matching And Reservation
1.5 Traveler Services Infonnation
1.7 Incident Management
1.8 Travel Demand Management
1.9 Emissions Testing And Mitigation
2. Public Transportation Management User Services
2.3 Personalized Public Transit
2.4 Public Travel Security
3. Electronic Payment User Services
3.1 Electronic Payment Services
4. Commercial Vehicle Operations User Services
4.1 Commercial Vehicle Electronic Clearance
4.2 Automated Roadside Safety Inspection
4.3 On-board Safety and Security Monitoring
4.4 Commercial Vehicle Administrative Processes
5. Emergency Management User Services
5.1 Emergency Notification And Personal Security
5.2 Emergency Vehicle Management
7. Infonnation Management User Services
7.1 Archived Data Function
Version 5.0 of the National ITS Architecture, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtrnlluser/userserv.htm(last
visited Aug. 9, 2004).
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Traffic Cameras

Video cameras that capture moving and still images of roadways and the
people and objects on them represent some of the most common ITS
surveillance technologies. Among the most widely used are remotely operated
closed-circuit television cameras located high above roadways, often
discretely placed so that they are difficult to see from the roadway. These
unobtrusive traffic cameras are usually operated and monitored by a traffic
management center located some distance away from the camera and the
highway being surveiled. The traffic management center operator has panzoom-tilt remote controls that permit the operator to pan along a highway,
zoom out to look at the general traffic landscape or tilt down and zoom in to
closely monitor particular locations (bridges, tunnels, on-ramps and offramps) or incidents (accidents or bottlenecks). Local television stations often
broadcast real-time wide-angle views from such cameras showing traffic
flows, or traffic jams. These real-time images of roadways are also popular
places on the websites of transportation agencies. In addition to television
cameras, still cameras can be installed at specific locations, such as at
entrances to parking facilities or airports, at intersections or even along highways. These still cameras automatically capture a digital image of each
vehicle that passes the camera.
When these cameras are used to focus on particular vehicles, they are
part of a group of ITS technologies known as Automated Vehicle Identification (A VI). For example, in many states still cameras automatically take
digital pictures of vehicles, and their drivers, that run red lights (red light
runner cameras) or exceed the speed limit (photo radar). These digital
pictures are often enhanced by license plate recognition, discussed below. In
the future, facial recognition software, that takes a digital image of a person's
face, even through a windshield, and compares it against a database of persons
of interest to law enforcement may also become a common feature of digital
cameras along roadsides.
When a traffic camera focuses in on an individual person, for example
by capturing an image of the face of a driver or passenger, the privacy of the
individual photographed is at stake. Remote television and still cameras can
also scrutinize pedestrians walking alongside a roadway, as well as bicyclists,
bystanders or people on sidewalks. Higher resolution cameras can capture
what an individual is doing, her apparent emotional state, who accompanies
her, what she is carrying or what she is reading. Moreover, traffic cameras
with remote control functions can permit unseen operators to capture images
of the faces and activities of people in nearby buildings, in addition to
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information about anonymous traffic flows and persons on or near the
roadway. 34

License Plate Recognition
Automatic license plate recognition is a specialized ITS application of
digital cameras. It is also a type of automatic vehicle identification (AVI). A
license plate reader takes a digital picture of a license plate, computerizes it
and then compares it against a database of license plate numbers and letters
associated with particular vehicles and their owners.35 Often the digitized
version of the numbers and letters on a license plate is stored for later
comparison with similar digitized data captured at other times and places.
License plate recognition is used for a variety of traffic management, weighin-motion commercial vehicle inspections, security, parking, border control
and other purposes. In the United Kingdom, the recently adopted system for
reducing traffic congestion in London relies on license plate recognition as the
basis for charging vehicles to enter central London during peak hours.36
From the perspective of privacy law in the United States, license plate
recognition is interesting because most of the decisional law regarding license
plates has not considered a license plate to be private information. The
argument is that a license plate cannot be private because it is after all affixed
to the exterior of the vehicle where it can be seen by whomever wants to take
notice. 37 However, in France, the European Data Union's Protection
Directive38 has been interpreted to protect the privacy of a person's license
plate number. 39

34. A California statute makes it illegal to use such cameras to peer into the privacy of a person's
home. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8. (West Supp. 2004).
35. The website of Hi-Tech Solutions, a company that specializes in advance image processing,
demonstrates the operation of license plate recognition, at http://htsol.com Oast visited Aug. 9, 2004).
36. The London system, called ''Congestion Charging," has its own website, at
http://www.cclondon.comOastvisitedAug.9.2004).This site even includes a Privacy Policy. See also,
Georgina Santos, Road Pricing on the Basis of Congestion Costs: Consistent Results from Two Historic
UK Towns (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, at http://www.econ.cam.ac.ukldaelpeoplelsantos/
trb2000.pdf Oast visited Aug. 9, 2004)).
37. Typical court decisions denying any reasonable privacy expectation in a license plate include:
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972,974 (10th Cir. 1989); State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997);
State v. Myrick, 659 A.2d 976 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
38. Council Directive 95/46IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, 1995 OJ. (L281).
39. Deliberation no. 96-069 du 10 septembre 1996 relative 11 la demande d'avis portant creation 11
titre experimental d'un traitement aautomatise d'informations nominatives ayaant pour finalite principale
la lecture automatique des plaques d'immatriculation des vebicules en movement par la societe des
autoroutes Paris-Rhin-RMne (SAPR). This ruling is discussed in JOEL R. REIDENBERG & PAUL M.
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Toll Tag Transponders

A different type of ITS automatic vehicle identification uses toll tags, an
increasingly common device used to pay tolls along United States roadways,
also to provide traffic surveillance. 40 Toll tags are transponders, usually
smaller than a deck of cards, that are capable of rudimentary two-way
communication. Most toll tags are voluntarily installed on the windshields of
vehicles by drivers who pass through tag-readers at toll collection points and
use their tags to automatically pay tolls for use of highways, bridges and
tunnels. Electronically, a toll tag is a simple two-way radio transmitter
programmed to respond to an activation signal with specific information typically the transponder's unique numeric identifier. 41 In most toll tag
systems, the transponder remains the property of the toll collection agency and
is licensed for use by drivers. In its toll collection function, the tag is automatically identified each time it passes close to a transponder-reader at a toll
collection facility. The toll tag reader uses the tag identification to deduct the
toll amount from what is usually a prepaid "debit" account. The Transportation Corridor Agencies in Southern California have also arranged for the
use of the toll tags to pay for purchases at McDonald's restaurants. Other toll
tag purchasing opportunities are planned - such as for parking, car washes,
automotive products such as gasoline and oil, as well as many other types of
goods and services.
Although toll tags can have several different technical formats, they are
designed to be generic, with an open architecture available to all. For
example, technical specifications for transponders used in California are
published in the California Code of Regulations title 21 sections 1700 -1705.8.
Any unshielded toll tag within range of a transponder reader can be addressed

SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAw AND ON-LINE SERVICES: REGULATORY RESPONSES 32 (2002),
available at http://europa.eu.intlcornmlintemal_marketlprivacy/docslstudiesfreguI3n.pdf (last visited Aug.
10,2004).
40. About twenty types of electronic toll collection systems are in use, mostly for bridge and
highway toll collection, in dozens of places around the United States.
41. Federal Communications Commission regulations regarding these devices are published at 47
C.F.R. § 15.251 (1989) under the category, "Automatic Vehicle Monitoring." These regulations may
change with the adoption of the new ITS DSCR standards, discussed infra. See IN THE MATTER OF
AMENDMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES REGARDING DEDICATED SHORT-RANGE COMMUNICATION
SERVICES IN THE 5.850-5.925 GHz BAND (5.9 GHz BAND); AMENDMENT OF PARTS 2 AND 90 OF THE
COMMISSIONSRULESTOALLOCATETHE5.850-5.925GHzBANDTOTHEMoBILESERVICEFORDEDICATED
SHORT RANGE COMMUNICATIONS OF INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, Release Number FCC 03324 (adopted Dec. 17,2003; released Feb. 10,2004) [hereinafter FCC 03-324], at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_publiclattachrnatchlFCC-03-324AI.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
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to respond with the device's unique identifier.42 So it is possible to follow the
successive locations of transponders, and the vehicles to which these devices
are attached, as they move past toll tag readers located at places along roads
and highways, as well as at toll collection facilities. The TravInfo ITS project
of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in the San Francisco Bay
Area has found that a network of such toll tag readers is a useful way to
collect information about traffic flows, volumes and speeds. 43
There is no immediate connection between a toll tag's unique identifier
and any particular vehicle or person. But the toll tag issuer typically
associates the unique identifier with the name, address and other information
regarding the licensed toll tag holder, as well as all vehicles in which the toll
tag may be used and the drivers who may drive those vehicles. 44
Vehicle Black Boxes
It is estimated that forty million vehicles in the United States45 already
have built into them event data recorders, or "crash data recorders." These
computerized diagnostic modules are informally called "black boxes," after
flight data recorders in airplanes. In the future, such equipment is expected
to become mandatory on all new vehicles sold in the United States. 46 Modem
vehicles usually have several computer modules that automatically sense and
record vehicle behavior, speed, mechanical operation, emissions, seat-belt use,
and the like. A typical Black Box is one of those modules - a critical-event
module designed to collect information about a vehicle in the seconds before
the vehicle's airbags deploy.
Many drivers know that their automobiles are equipped with expensiveto-repair computers. But they usually do not know, because manufacturers do
not often disclose it, that within the vehicle's computer system is an event data

42. California Code of Regulations title 21 section 1703(1) provides for a " 32-bit code [that]
uniquely identifies which transponder is responding to a polling request or is being acknowledged." CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 21. § 1703(1). Addressing a toll tag transponder is called "pinging" the transponder.
43. See the Metropolitan Transportation Commission website. at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/projectsl
travinfo/travinfl.htm (last visited Aug. 9. 2004).
44. It is interesting to contrast the user agreements of various toll collection agencies. For example.
when the state department of transportation. Cal trans. issues a toll tag. it is accompanied by a Personal
Information Notice that notes restrictions on disclosure of information provided in the application for a toll
tag. However. other issuers. such as bridge districts and private-sector toll road agencies, do not promise
such non-disclosure of the information collected in the application and licence agreement for their toll tags.
45. Ed Garsten, Auto" Black Boxes" Defended, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 20, 2003, at lB. These crash
data recorders are standard equipment on General Motors vehicles, as well as some Ford models and those
of a number of other manufacturers.
46. They are already required on busses and commercial vehicles, and are under active consideration
as required equipment in all vehicles. Most black boxes in use in the United States are manufactured by
Vetronix. See Vetronix website, at http://www.vetronix.comlmain.html(last visited Aug. 10,2004).
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recorder, or critical-event module, designed to automatically capture the
driver's speed, driving patterns, seatbelt use, and the mechanical status of the
vehicle at the time of an accident. Vehicle manufacturers and insurance
companies routinely have diagnosticians download data from these modules
for use in analyzing the causes of accidents and assessing legal liability.
The legal issues regarding who owns and has control over the event data
collected by a vehicle's Black Box remains unresolved in most of the United
States, except California. In 2003 California enacted a statute, California
Vehicle Code section 9951, which provides that, as of July 2004, car
manufacturers must disclose information about the event data recorders in
owner's manuals. Moreover, the statute makes clear that the data contained
in the black box is owned by the car owner. Anyone else who wishes to
access the event data must secure the consent of the car owner or subpoena the
data. 47
In the future, whether a vehicle is speeding or its driver is wearing a
seatbelt may be automatically communicated to an array of roadside receivers
using the dedicated short range communications technology described·
below. 48 Since ITS industries have already developed adaptive systems such
as airbags that sense the height and weight of vehicle occupants and then
modify the operation of airbags for persons of short stature, such as children,
all sorts of diagnostic information might be transmitted. For example, an
engineer has patented an in-car system that weighs dieters and counsels them
when and what to eat. 49 Such a system could be connected to vehicles's
wireless communication systems for transmission to the roadside receiver
units described below.
Global Positioning Systems (GPS)

A number of ITS systems that involve keeping track of the locations of
vehicles as they move across the physical landscape rely on Global Positioning Systems (GPS).50 GPS is a highly accurate positioning and navigation
technology using a constellation of United States government satellites. There
are 24 GPS satellites equipped with atomic clocks in 12-hour orbits 12,000
miles above the earth. Each satellite constantly transmits the precise time and
the satellite's position in space. From the ground, between five and eight
satellites can be seen from any place on earth.

47. CAL.VEH. CODE § 9951 (2003), discussed infra notes 321"23.
4S. See text infra note 59.
49. Sabra Chartrand, Patents: An In-car System for Dieters That Weights Them and Tells Them
When They Have Strayed, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at CS.
50. There are other ways to keep track of the locations of vehicles such as the cellular
telecommunications triangulation described infra note 61.
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A vehicle equipped with a GPS receiver uses four satellites to compute
four dimensions of position and time to determine the vehicle's location, as
well as its speed and direction. Standard Positioning systems can locate a
vehicle within 100 meters. More accurate positioning is available through
Differential GPS that can locate the vehicle within 1 meter. Differential GPS
makes use of a differential signal broadcast from a base station that corrects
for inaccuracies caused by the satellite signal's passage through the atmosphere. Dual differential GPS is capable of locating a GPS receiver within
one or two centimeters. 51 GPS can locate a vehicle for a variety of vehiclebased telecommunications functions, including telematics and dedicated short
range communications as well as other types of mobile communications. Each
of these communications-related technologies will be discussed below. Law
enforcement use of GPS devices will be discussed in the next section.

Telematics
Telematics refers to vehicle-based mobile telecommunications systems,
associated with ITS. Broadly speaking, telematics enables vehicles, infrastructure such as toll facilities, and travel information providers to communicate with each other. Most telematics systems depend on GPS to locate the
telematics user for the purposes of information services, although telematics
may make use of any of a wide range of different types of wireless communications. Location-based information services include navigation assistance,
internet access, localized real-time traffic and weather reports, travel information about nearby food, lodging and other services, as well as entertainment,
such as satellite radio or on-line karaoke. Some of telematics' navigation and
travel information systems also use advanced geographical information
systems (GIS) such as digital map technologies to provide directions and location assistance. The movements of telematics-equipped vehicles can be
tracked by traffic managers and compared with historical data about traffic
flows to assess real-time traffic conditions such as slow speeds due to congestion. 52 In some areas, parents use telematics to keep track of teenage children
while the latter are driving. 53
Perhaps the best known of the telematics systems, because it is so widely
advertised in the United States, is OnStar by General Motors. OnStar provides

& CHRIS RIZOS, POSITIONING SYSTEMS IN INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION
See also NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, A

51. CHRIS DRANE
SYSTEMS (1998).

TECHNICALREPORTTOTHESECRETARYOFTRANSPORTATIONONANATIONALAPPROACHTOAuGMENTED

available at http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov//JPODOCSIREPTS_TEllrOl !.PDF
(last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
52. Tim Moran, Going with the Flow; Telematics-equipped Vehicles Feed Real-time Information
to Highway Systems, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 23, 2002, at 24T.
53. Joe Ledford, Parents Bug Cars to Track Teens, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 21, 2002, at lA.
GPS SERVICES (1994),
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emergency roadway assistance as well as travel information through wireless
voice communications with a central OnStar monitoring station. OnStar and
other systems, such as Networkcar and Vetronix, connect telematics functions
with internal diagnostic features of vehicles. 54 The OnStar website describes
telematics technology as providing "a broad and evolving array of safety,
security, convenience and communications services that are delivered using
on-board vehicle electronics, wireless telecommunication technologies, the
Internet and global positioning satellite location information."55
OnStar Privacy Principles detail OnStar' s gathering of personal information: "When you use the OnStar services, we may routinely collect information, such as the automatic network numbering information provided via the
telephone network (Caller-ID information), the location of your vehicle
provided by satellite and GPS electronics, or any other information, including
your preferences or usage patterns.,,56 At the end of its Privacy Principles,
OnStar offers the following assurance: "You take privacy seriously, and so do
we at OnStar. It's our way of sustaining your trust in OnStar and our products
and services. After all, your trust is what we value most.,,57 But in the fine
print, the OnStar Privacy Principles note that:
While OnStar is committed to protecting your privacy, we cannot
guarantee that your private communications and other personally
identifiable information will never be disclosed in ways not described
in this policy. Subscribers are cautioned that the privacy of any
information sent via wireless cellular communications will not be
assured. Third parties may, for instance, unlawfully intercept or
access transmissions and private communications without our
consent. In addition, OnStar may disclose personal information if
required to do so by law on in [sic] the good faith belief that such
disclosure is reasonably necessary to (i) comply with the legal
process, (ii) respond to claims of a violation of the rights of third
parties, or (iii) protect the rights, property or safety of OnStar, our
users or the public. OnStar cannot accept any responsibility for
accidental or inadvertent disclosure, unauthorized access or for other
disclosure as required by law or described in this policy. 58

54. Remote Diagnostics··the Next OEM Frontier, 16 THE HANSEN REP. ON AUTOMOTIVE
ELECTRONICS, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 1.
55. OnStar Privacy Principles located on the OnStarwebsite, at http://www.onstar.com/us_english!
jsp/gUenns_privacy.jsp?page=gl_privacy.jsp (last visited Aug. 10,2004).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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OnStar is fairly typical with regard to the types of information used in its
telematics services. It is somewhat unusual in expressing concern about the
privacy of telematics users.
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)

Q

A Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Report and Order
released in February 2004 is likely to enhance and expand telematics in the
United States. The FCC Order allocates to Intelligent Transportation Systems
radio frequencies between 5.850 and 5.925 GHz and adopts the ASTM E22I303 (ASTM-DSRC) communications standard that extends wi-fi (IEEE
standards 802.11 and 802. 11 a) to vehicles traveling at high speeds. 59 These
DSRC communications involve On-board Units (OBUs) associated with GPS
automatic location equipment. OBUs are designed to be carried in moving
vehicles. The FCC rule contemplates both communications between OBUs
in nearby vehicles and communications between OBUs and Roadside Units
(RSUs) located along roads and highways.
Most OBUs will be built into vehicles, although portable versions are
also contemplated in the form of digital assistants and even smart tags on
products and packages. In fact, the United States Department of Transportation has for some time considered requiring OBU devices as standard
equipment on all vehicles sold in the United States. An OBU is a two-way
radio transceiver, built into or carried in a vehicle. The OBU is designed to
communicate automatically with DSRC-equipped roadside units as well as
with other vehicles equipped with OBUs. Automatic communications
between vehicles equipped with OBUs will enable automatic crash avoidance
and automatic warning of dangerous lane changes before one vehicle changes
lanes into the path of another on-coming vehicle. The FCC rule also appears
to contemplate a variety of other short-range communications between
vehicles over an open wi-fi band. OBUs will not require special FCC licenses,
so long as they are interoperable with the 802.II-based communication
standard adopted for ITS.
RSUs located along roadways will communicate with OBUs through
antennas located up to 45 feet above the roadway. RSUs will be licensed on
a non-exclusive basis for a geographic area, on a first-come first-served basis.
RSU transmitters are allowed to have up to 30 watts of power and the capacity
to send and receive communications from about 5 feet to about 3,000 feet.
Nationwide licenses will be available, but only for designated geographic
areas that are claimed in a particular RSU registration. Public safety communications will have priority; but bandwidth will be available to commercial

59. FCC 03-324, supra note 41.
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RSUs in the order of their registrations with the FCC. Although the FCC
claims that roadway safety is the main motivation for the ITS DSRC
allocation, commercial applications, including a wide variety of telematics
services, such as location-based commerce and travel services, are likely to
bring location-specific advertising and travel information into OBU-equipped
vehicles. OBUs witt also be associated with payment systems so that they will
ultimately replace toll tags for access to toll facilities and for other payment
purposes.
Among the interesting features of the FCC's authorization of DSRC for
ITS is the absence of any mention of standards or controls with regard to the
privacy or security of the information transmitted. Right now this new
vehicle-centered application of wireless communications technology is
intentionally wide open to the development of competing systems. However,
that very openness can pose risks, such as intrusion and misuse of personal
information, that affect the privacy of people who use vehicles equipped with
OBUs.
Wireless Communications

Highly popular and not limited to use on the road, wireless mobile telecommunications are essential components of existing vehicle-based telematics. Independently of telematics, cellular telephones, wi-fi and bluetooth
devices are frequently used by drivers and pedestrians. An invisible function
of these wireless telecommunications devices is their legally required capacity
to pinpoint the location of each mobile telecommunications device.
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 designated
"911" as the nation-wide emergency telephone number for wireless, as well
as wireline, telephones. That statute also contained an E911 mandate requiring wireless carriers to be able to locate wireless 911 callers for emergency
services purposes. 60 FCC regulations require wireless carriers to have 95
percent of their subscribers using location-capable handsets (either by incorporating GPS in handsets or by network-based triangulation) by December 31,
2005. 61 The resulting information about the location of wireless communications users is called Automatic Location Information (ALD. ALI is to be used
by wireless carriers for making automatic connections between a located
wireless device and emergency services. ALI is also available to law
enforcement under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
18 U.S.c. § 2522 and 47 U.S.c. §§ 229,1001-101062 as modified by the USA

60. 47 U.S.C. § 25 I (e) (2001).
61. 47 C.F.R. § 20. I 8(g)(1 )(v) (2003). These regulations require location accuracy to be better than
300 meters for almost all calls. and better than 150 meters for two-thirds of all calls.
62. Cell phone records have been successfully used as evidence in criminal cases. See. e.g.• United
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PATRIOT Act. 63 Legal restrictions on the use of this location information
derived from wireless telecommunications are discussed below. 64
Data Archives

The potential for storing itineraries of the locations to and from which a
person has traveled in the past is embraced by one of the newer ITS user
services - Archived Data User Service (ADUS).65 Transportation planners use
origin-destination information to predict future transportation demands in
designing highways and public transit systems. But marketing companies also
use such information to predict future travel and purchasing decisions.
Moreover, advertisers use such information to construct profiles for targeted
advertising. ITS Archived Data User Services are designed to collect and
retain transportation data for longitudinal studies of traffic patterns regarding
particular locations or transportation segments over time. At present, ADUS
technologies do not focus on collecting and storing individual itineraries of
particular persons.
But there is likely to be demand, backed by substantial financial
resources, for such individualized travel-pattern information in the future.
Marketing organizations would find archives of individualized information
highly valuable in consumer profiling. Divorce lawyers have already indicated keen interest in such historical data. Law Enforcement agencies also
will be likely to find such archived itineraries useful, for example, in placing
a suspect at or near the scene of a crime. Moreover, intelligence agencies may
seek such information for homeland security purposes. For example, archives
of individual data derived from ITS systems would be a highly sought-after

States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
63. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
64. See discussion in text infra notes 302-11.
65. According to the ITS National Architecture 5.0, Section 7.1 ADUS data is managed by an
Archived Data Management System that "collects, archives, manages, and distributes data generated from
ITS sources for use in transportation administration, policy evaluation, safety, planning, performance
monitoring, program assessment, operations, and research applications. The data received is formatted,
tagged with attributes that define the data source, conditions under which it was collected, data
transformations, and other information (i.e. meta data) necessary to interpret the data. The subsystem can
fuse ITS generated data with data from non-ITS sources and other archives to generate information products
utilizing data from multiple functional areas, modes, and jurisdictions. The subsystem prepares data
products that can serve as inputs to Federal, State, and local data reporting systems. This subsystem may
be implemented in many different ways. It may reside within an operational center and provide focused
access to a particular agency's data archives. Alternatively, it may operate as a distinct center that collects
data from multiple agencies and sources and provides a general data warehouse service for a region."
Archived Data Management System, ITS National Architecture 5.0, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtrnll
entity/adms_b.htm (last visited Aug. 10,2004).
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component of such data aggregation efforts as TIA or CAPPS II, discussed
above. 66
Law Enforcement Surveillance Technologies

For a long time, law enforcement agencies have used an array of surveillance techniques in their efforts to find, catch and convict criminal
suspects. 67 These surveillance techniques, used both for criminal law enforcement and for intelligence purposes, include physical tracking on the ground
or by aircraft. On the technological side, probably the most frequently used
law enforcement surveillance technology is the electronic tracking device,
actually a group of technologies that includes "beepers" and related devices,
such as GPS. Recently, law enforcement has begun to use automatic location
information from wireless telecommunications, as well. Most of these
technologies are designed to facilitate tracking a target who remains unaware
of being tracked. Two other law enforcement tracking technologies, photo
radar and photo red light, are often used openly to deter traffic violations such
as speeding and running red lights.
Electronic Tracking Devices

Federal electronic surveillance laws describe an electronic tracking
device as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object.,,68 The Senate Report explains the use of
electronic tracking devices, such as beeper transponders, which the Report
defines as:

66. See text supra notes 10-12.
67. Before the advent of the automobile. law enforcement agents and agencies hunted down
highwaymen and bandits who made surface transportation difficult and dangerous. See, e.g., The
Highwayman's Case (Everet v. Williams), 35 L.Q.REV. (July 1893), available at http://www.hosteny.coml
funcaseslhighwayman.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
The romantic side of highwaymen and pursuit of them by law enforcement is captured in Alfred
Noyes' famous early twentieth century poem, The Highwayman. The landlord's black-eyed daughter, Bess,
is ultimately used by the Red-Coat soldiers to snare the highwayman who vows to return to her:
"One Kiss, my bonny sweetheart, I'm after a prize to-night,
But I shall be back with the yellow gold before the morning light;
Yet if they press me sharply, and harry me through the day,
Then look for me by moonlight,
Watch for me by moonlight,
I'll come to thee by moonlight, though hell should br the way."
ALFRED NOYES, THE HIGHWAYMAN (Stanza V) (Charles Keeping, Oxford University Press. 1983).
available at http://www.potw.orglarchivelpotw85.html(last visited Aug. 10,2004).
68. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 108(b), 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2001). This
definition is broad enough to encompass toll tags, as well as the beepers and GPS devices more frequently
used by law enforcement.

HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 314 2004

2004]

OPEN ROAD

315

one-way radio communication devices that emit a signal on a specific
radio frequency. This signal can be received by special tracking
equipment, and allows the user to trace the geographical location of
the transponder. Such "homing" devices are used by law enforcement
personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the sending
unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on a person, or in some
other item. 69
Because they do not intercept the content of communications, electronic
tracking devices are exempt from most restrictions on law enforcement use of
electronic surveillance. 70 Rather they are governed by 18 U.S.c. § 3117,
which provides for warrants authorizing the installation and monitoring of
electronic tracking devices. 7l
Beepers

Law enforcement use of beeper72 transmitters became widespread by the
second half of the twentieth century. Attached to a person or object, such as
a vehicle, so that the person or object can be followed from a remote location,
beepers are simple and relatively inexpensive devices. Usually a beeper takes
the form of a battery-operated one-way transmitter that continuously emits an
electronic signal that is inaudible at the place from which the signal is
transmitted. Beepers are often quite small-usually smaller than toll-tag
transponders. They can be attached to a vehicle in a hidden spot, perhaps
under a bumper, or placed in a container or even on a person. Miniaturized
beepers, about the size of a capsule are sometimes implanted in pets, and even
people (such as Alzheimer patients), to help find the persons or pets, should
they become lost.
In law enforcement investigations, agents attach a beeper to someone or
something they want to track from a remote monitoring post or a patrol
vehicle. A receiver operator located away from the target, and unseen by the
targeted person follows the electronic signal continuously emitted from the
transponder. The direction and distance from which the signal comes, as the

69. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3117. These tracking device warrants issued under Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure Rule 41, may provide for use of the tracking devices outside the geographical jurisdiction of the
authorizing court.
72. Beepers are distinguished from bugs because beepers only indicate the location of the signalemitting transmitter. Beepers do not have the capacity to overhear conversations or intercept
communications. "Bugs" and "bugging" normally refer to hidden microphones used to surreptitiously hear
and record conversations near the location of the microphone by remote listeners or recorders.
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signal moves from place to place, is indicated by varying frequencies of beeps
heard by the operator. These sounds gave rise to the name, "beeper." Beepers
are often used when visual surveillance either does not work or is intermittently lost in following a target. In United States v. Knotts, 73 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the use of such beepers as an aid to visual
surveillance.74 Later in United States v. Karo,75 the Court limited the use of
beepers to areas outside the home. 76 According to the Court's opinion in
Karo, monitoring a beeper becomes a search under the Fourth Amendment
when it reveals "a critical fact about the interior" of a home that could not
have been obtained by visual surveillance. 77 As will be discussed in more
detail below, when they are followed on the open road, beepers generally do
not raise Fourth Amendment issues. 78
With the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in
1986, federal electronic surveillance statutes79 explicitly recognized the use
of beepers and other electronic tracking devices. 80 According to the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in United States v. Gbemisoia, 8 1 the sole
function of the electronic tracking device section (§ 3117) of the electronic
surveillance statute is to authorize monitoring of electronic devices, such as
beepers, outside the jurisdiction of the authorizing judicial officer. Such
beeper warrants were an early example of "roving warrants" which became
controversial when the USA PATRIOT Act authorized extension of roving
warrants to agencies gathering foreign intelligence. 82
GPS Devices

Global Positioning System (GPS) devices used by law enforcement
agencies are small, but usually larger than beepers. They contain not only a

73. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
74. [d.
75. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). See also United States v. Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation, Monitoring, Maintaining, Repairing, & Removing of Elec. Transmitting
Devices & Infra-Red Tracking Devices on or Within a White Ford Truck, 155 F.R.D. 401 (D. Mass. 1994).
76. Karo, 486 U.S. at 715.

77. /d.
78. See text infra notes 172-93.
79. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2001).
81. 225 F.3d 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) cert denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000). Gbemisola involved a beeper
hidden in an international shipment of heroin hidden in ceramic pots. [d. at 755. A vehicle (taxi) was only
tangentially involved in the investigation. See id. A California Court of Appeal made a similar ruling in
a similar beeper case involving importation of heroin that only incidentally involved a vehicle. People v.
Salih, 219 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
82. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2001).
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GPS satellite communications function that pinpoints the device's location. 83
They also contain computerized recording devices, or logs. Law enforcement
agents attach a GPS device to the underside of a vehicle, in a place where it
will not be noticed. From then on the device automatically keeps a detailed
time and place itinerary of everywhere the vehicle travels and when and how
long it remains at various locations. Later, law enforcement agents remove
the device and download the detailed itinerary of where and when the vehicle
has traveled. Unlike beepers, GPS devices do not require continuous
monitoring by a law enforcement agent. 84
In a murder case involving a father prosecuted for the murder of his
daughter, whose body remained hidden for a substantial period of time, the
Washington Supreme Court described police use of a GPS device. 85 The
defendant was not informed about the GPS devices that, pursuant to warrants,
had been connected to the 12-volt electrical systems of his vehicles while the
vehicles were impounded by police. Based on information from the devices,
police tracked the vehicles to two locations where evidence of the murder and
the body of the victim were eventually found several weeks after the murder.
The court explained that, "Use of the GPS devices allowed the vehicles'
positions to be precisely tracked when the data from the devices was downloaded."86 GPS devices facilitate automatic tracking by electronic means,
obviating the need for human trackers.
As noted earlier, vehicle owners often voluntarily install GPS devices a
part of telematics systems for travel assistance and emergency purposes. If a
GPS-equipped vehicle is stolen, the device can be useful in retrieving the
vehicle. In a number of successful prosecutions for car theft, stolen vehicles
were located through GPS systems voluntarily installed in vehicles by their
owners.87

83. See discussion of GPS supra notes 50-51.
84. In a case involving a prosecution for cultivating marijuana in a National Forest, Drug
Enforcement agents used both a beeper (a Birddog 300) and a GPS device on a defendant's vehicle. United
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
85. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2(03). The facts of this case and the use of GPS
monitoring are comparable to similar aspects of the California prosecution of Scott Peterson for the murder
of his wife and unborn son. Peterson was tracked from January to April 2003 through a GPS device
attached to several of Peterson's vehicles. Information from the devices that showed that Peterson had
made repeated trips to the place where the victim's bodies were later found, was admitted at trial. Stacy
Finz et al., Groundbreaking Ruling in Peterson Trial; Tracking Device Evidence Can Be Presented, S.P.
CHRON., Feb. 18,2004, at All.
86. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 257.
87. E.g., Hicks v. State, 852 So. 2d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2(03); State v. Morton, 81 P.3d 461
(Kan. Ct. App. 2(03); State v. Bailey, 577 S.E.2d 683 (N.C. Ct. App. 2(03). Each of these cases involved
use of the GPS aspects of an OnStar telematics system.
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Wireless Telecommunications
Wireless Telecommunications and the automatic location information
required as part of wireless telecommunications services 88 are also available
to law enforcement for tracking purposes. A recent decision upholding law
enforcement's tracking of suspects through wireless communications is United
States v. Forest. 89 The Sixth Circuit approved Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents' controversial surveillance technique that found and
followed drug suspects by calling a cellular telephone in the vehicle in which
the drug dealers were making their rounds. Since cellular telephones seem to
be standard equipment for drug dealers, the DEA agents repeatedly called the
cell phone, but hung up before the phone rang. Even without ringing the cell
phone, the calls generated "cell-site data" that allowed the agents to find and
to follow the suspects, partly through visual surveillance and partly through
tracking the cell site data. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that law
enforcement use of the cellular telephone site data indicating the suspects's
location was not a tracking device, nor did use of the cell-site location data
involve interception of communications protected under the federal electronic
surveillance laws. 90
Photo Radar and Photo Red Light
Photo radar and its companion technology, photo red light, are applications of remote camera and license plate recognition systems discussed above.
They represent an automated approach to enforcement of traffic laws. Both
photo radar and photo red light use digital cameras to automatically generate
traffic tickets for speeding and red light running, respectively. These
automated traffic tickets usually contain digital pictures of the traffic violation
and of the offending driver as he or she appears through the windshield at the
time of the violation. These automatic tickets also usually include a digitized
picture of the license plate, since license plate recognition is used to connect
the vehicle's license plate to the name and address of the vehicle's registered
owner. So far, this automated traffic law enforcement does not rely on facial
recognition, such as the controversial Facelt software. 91 But in the future,

88. See text, supra notes 60-61.
89. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
90. But see, Company v. United States (In re United States), 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). The
Ninth Circuit did not reach the electronic surveillance issues. [d. Instead, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that requested law enforcement use of a telematics communication system for the purpose of
intercepting communications taking place in the telematics-equipped car was improper because it interfered
with the emergency response features of the telematics communication system. [d.
91. Facelt software, Identix, Inc. website, a! http://www.identix.comlproductslpro_sdks_multi.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2004).
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such automated facial recognition technology may be added, if it is found to
be sufficiently accurate in this context.
Red light cameras and photo radar are often combined into a system of
automatic traffic enforcement. 92 The automatic surveillance cameras can be
either autonomous units at fixed sites, or under the control of an officer in a
patrol car. The digital cameras may be hidden, or may be visible and even
accompanied by warning signs that photo radar or photo red light technologies
are in use. The units are programmed to capture images only when a traffic
violation, such as running a red light or speeding, occurs. Triggered by such
a violation, the camera automatically records the violation and its perpetrator
and then sends the digital information to a processing center for the automatic
generation of a traffic citation. The citation may even be automatically
addressed and mailed to the registered owner of the vehicle, who is presumed
to be the perpetrator. The entire traffic enforcement process is almost untouched by human hands.
When red light and photo radar cameras are located at highly visible
fixed sites or are accompanied by signs giving notice of the cameras'
presence, they are used to deter traffic infractions by emphasizing the likelihood of being caught. High visibility cameras are often used to discourage
speeding in school zones or running red lights at particularly dangerous intersections where fatalities have occurred in the past. A typical high-visibility
deterrence technique combines a portable photo radar unit with a variable
message sign that informs drivers about just how fast they are driving in a
restricted speed zone. As might be expected, several states have outlawed the
use of photo radar as unfair, or as "just not sporting" as some photo radar
opponents often put it.
These are just some of the broad array of technologies available to
intelligence agencies and law enforcement for use in finding and tracking
people on the open road. From electronic tracking devices, such as beepers
and GPS devices, to cell phones and even photo radar, law enforcement is
well-equipped technologically to track people on the open road. Law
enforcement agents are likely also to be allowed to access information from
non-law enforcement systems, such as information generated by toll tags and
other aspects of ITS. In fact, the USA PATRIOT Act was designed to provide
law enforcement more ready access to just such records. 93

92. A typical combined system of this type is illustrated at the Redflex Holding Limited website,
at http://www.redflex.com (last visited Aug. 10,2004).
93. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (2001).
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III. PRIVACY INTERESTS ON THE OPEN ROAD

Since where a person is located reflects who that person is, individuals
are concerned when somebody else scrutinizes their whereabouts. Individual
privacy is affected when others keep track of a person as she or he moves
about in physical space on public roads. A person's location and travel
patterns reveal the person's activities, associations and what he or she
considers important. The technologies discussed in the previous section can
follow an individual's every movement on public roadways in real time on a
continuous· basis. Often this scrutiny is unseen by the individual. But the
possibility of scrutiny is omnipresent. As a result, individuals have no way. of
knowing whether or when their activities are being watched.
.
Logically, activities that are open to sight and hearing, such as traveling
on a public road, do not seem to be very private.· And yet even out on the open
road certain privacy interests remain significant. Understanding the privacy
interests affected when a person's on-the-road activities are, or can be, tracked
and recorded requires looking beyond what appears to be a surface contradiction between privacy and the open road.
The moral philosopher, Jeffrey Reiman examined the privacy interests
of people traveling along public roadways in his seminal Driving to the
Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration ofthe Risks to Privacy Posed by the
Highway Technology of the Future. 94 The article suggests the image of a
panopticon (literally an all-seeing device) which Jeremy Bentham advocated
as a powerful prison design in 1791. Bentham's concept of a panopticon
prison made each prisoner's every movement continuously visible to guards
who could watch all of the prisoners all of the time. Bentham noted that in
practice it would not be necessary to have guards actually watch each prisoner
at every moment. Simply the potential for complete and continuous vi~ibility
would cause each prisoner to watch himself all the time. Such a system
would, Bentham argued, give the state even more power over prisoners than
keeping the prisoners bound in chains. In short, the panopticon was designed
to give authorities intense control over prisoners.9S Concerns about abject
conformity and warped human personalities that could result from such a
dystopian everyone-is-visible-all-the-time regime was, of course, part of the
searing image of an all-seeing Big Brother in George Orwell's novel, 1984.96

94. Jeffrey H. Reiman. Driving to the Panopticon: A philosophical Exploration of the Risks to
Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future. II SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L
1. 27 (1995).
95.. Michel Foucault emphasized this point in his discussions of what Foucault called "panopticism."
MICHEL foUCAULT. DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH 195-228 (Alan Sheridan trans .• Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1978).
96. ORWELL, supra note 7.
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The world of the panopticon, or of 1984, offers a powerful perspective on
some of the privacy interests at stake on the open road.
Defining privacy as "the condition in which others are depri,ved of access
to you,,,97 Reiman describes some of the moral risks posed by a complex of
information-gathering and surveillance focused on highway travelers. One
such risk is the vulnerability of people, whose movements are monitored, to
having their behavior controlled by others through pressures, legal and
otherwise, for social conformity, rather than through independent thought and
action. Moreover, Reiman warns against the destructive effect on human
personality of not having .control over who observes and keeps track of an
observed individual.98 Indeed,' comprehensive surveillance tends to be socially
destructive because it signals disrespect for the individual person by treating
Qer as an object, rather than .as a self-determining individual. In the end,
pervasive surveillance can distort the very nature of a human personality. It
saps a person of dignity and self-respect by distorting the way the individual
thinks of himself and for himself. The individual person becomes an object
to be acted upon, rather than a morally responsible actor.
. Privacy interests are grounded in such concerns about individual worth
and self-determination,99 the right of an individual to decide for herself where
she will go and what she will do. Although writers about privacy have long
argued about particular language or categories describing privacy, 100 modem
legal analysis conventionally divides privacy interests into two categories:
autonomy privacy (or decisional privacy) interests and information privacy (or
data privacy) interests. 101 Privacy interests in the context of public roads and'
highways are notable in combining both autonomy privacy interests and information privacy interests, as well as a third factor that affects both categories
97. Reiman, supra note 94, at 30.
98. Jeffrey Rosen has made a similar point in his books. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED SOCIETY
(2003); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE (2000).
99. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REv. 193, 198 .
(1890). Brandeis, who was the primary author of the article referred to privacy as the individual's right to
an "inviolate personality." Id. at 205. See Dorothy Glancy, The Invention ofthe Rightto Privacy, 21 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1 (1979).
100. For leading legal theoreticians who propose different views of privacy see ARTHUR R. MILLER,
THE AsSAULT ON PRNACY (1971); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRNACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Richard A. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, 12 GA. L. REv.
393 (1978); William L Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REv. 383 (1960).
101. This is the approach of the California courts in describing the privacy interests protected under
the California Constitution's guarantee of an "inalienable right to privacy," (CAL. CONST. art. L § 1 (1879».
Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633,654 (Cal. 1994). The court described information
privacy as ''interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information."
Id. Autonomy privacy refers to "interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal
activities without observation, intrusion or interference." Id.
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of privacy interests. This third factor is the panopticon effect of comprehensive surveillance suggested by Professor Reiman, as discussed above.
Autonomy Privacy Interests

Autonomy privacy interests are characterized by a person's ability to
make decisions and to act "without observation, intrusion or interference." 102
Indeed, surveillance of people on the open road implicates several types of
autonomy interests, such as the right to go where one wants to go without
being watched, the right to consent, or not, to others' use of one's travel
patterns, and the right not to be intruded on by oppressive governmental or
private-sector entities-Big Brother, Big Sister and the gang oflittle brothers
noted at the beginning of this article. Although, autonomy privacy is often
associated with intimate choices such as those regarding sex and procreation,
other much less intimate choices and activities also deserve protection against
outside interference.
Protection of autonomy has historically embraced freedom of movement.
For example, Justice William O. Douglas, in describing various zones of
privacy, envisioned an outermost privacy zone where the individual has "freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf." 103 Surveillance systems, such as those described
above, whether they are law enforcement or ITS systems, affect the autonomy
of travelers by overriding individual control over who or what watches and
keeps track of an individual's movements from place to place. Travelers
forced to look over their shoulders for surveillance systems are affected by not
knowing whether or when their actions are being captured by others. Particularly in choices about whether or not to do something unconventional or to
go to a potentially controversial place, this uncertainty can be stifling. When
such surveillance is under the control of the government, privacy concerns
become also political concerns about centralizing too much power in a
overbearing state.
Roadway surveillance affects autonomy privacy interests in several ways.
First, unseen collection of information about where people travel is often
connected up with these travelers' personal data, consumption patterns or
other information about them, without the persons involved being aware of,
much less consenting to the collection of the information. When such information is combined and consolidated with other personal information into a
profile of an individual's supposed personal characteristics, the individual
deserves to be consulted. Even aside from information privacy issues discussed below, such practices treat people as objects, rather than as autonom-

102. [d.
103. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 322 2004

2004]

OPEN ROAD

323

ous persons. Such practices also make people fear potential consequences
such as increased insurance rates, marital discord, or the appearance of hypocrisy. Even when marketing companies do not identify particular drivers,
individuals whose movements are monitored without their consent often feel
manipulated by being turned into fodder for an unseen data base in which the
individuals did not agree to participate.
Moreover, people feel violated when surveillance results in feedback in
the form of marketing pitches based on "personal" profiles used to label them
as belonging in one consumer category or another. For example, people who
regularly travel between particular geographic areas may be "branded" as
having particular characteristics, such as income level or ethnicity. Although
demographic information in such profiles may be aggregated, the potential for
disaggregation, to the point of identifying a particular person, causes further
privacy concerns. After all, when aggregate data is "sliced and diced" (as the
marketing industry aptly describes techniques of data analysis), it often
becomes possible to narrow the reference down to a particular individual. For
example, sorting by zip code, then year and type of vehicle, and perhaps age
can sharpen the demographic focus to just one or two people.
In addition, advertising use of demographic information often seeks to
psychologically manipulate consumers targeted according to the neighborhood
in which they live or the locations to which they travel. Most people find
receiving unsolicited information from an anonymous source that knows
where they live, where they have driven recently and where they regularly
travel to be very unsettling and intrusive. In the future, when drivers receive
such targeted information from their on-board DSRC unit as they drive from
one place to another, the sense of intrusion, not to mention the noise level, is
likely to be magnified. In the near future, telematics systems will automatically beam billboard-type advertising into vehicles by sending location-based
advertising messages directly targeted to identified drivers. When that
happens complaints about intrusion are likely to rise. Drivers intruded upon
by such targeted marketing messages may find this beamed advertising much
more intrusive than billboards, which drivers can simply refuse to look at.
Finally, an individual may never know that law enforcement agencies,
perhaps for intelligence or investigative purposes, not only have collected
surveillance information but also have gained access to privately collected
consumer data. Even law-abiding drivers may feel the pressure of such
potential unseen government scrutiny. As law enforcement concerns about
terrorist threats involving transportation systems has increased, people are
aware of an increased emphasis on watching out for threats and dangerous
people on the nation's often-congested highways. Most people on highways
probably share such concerns about homeland security. But they also may
find that their autonomy is constrained by the potential for being watched and
recorded everywhere they go on what still ironically called "the open road."
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Information Privacy Interests
Information privacy interests are concerned with "precluding the dissemination or rriisuse of sensitive and confidenti~· information." 104 Information
privacy interests are affected when surveillance systems collect, categorize, .
use and store information about a person's whereabouts, both past and present.
When that is done without the person's consent, the autonomy privacy
interests discussed above are also affected. Because a person's location at a
particular moment may also be very sensitive information, such roadway
surveillance often affects information privacy interests· as well. Personal
location information, for example, may be just what an individual does not
want others, such as a stalker, to know. Although a person's pattern of travel
is rarely completely secret or confidential, a person expects that her movements from place to place will be evanescent, leaving no permanent trace. .
Alexander Sholzenitzen capfured the sense of being trapped by records
in his famous image of personal information as the strands of a spider web:
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the
record, each containing a number of questions. . .. There are thus
hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of
threads in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the
whole sky would look like a spider's web, and if they materialized as
rubber bands, buses, trams and even people would all lose the ability
to move, ~d the wind would be unable to carry tom-up newspapers
or autumn leaves along the streets of the city. They are not visible,
they are not material, but every man is constantly aware of their
existence. . ~. Each man, permanently aware of his· own invisible
threads~ naturally develops a respect for the people who manipulate
the threads. 105
Information about a person's movements in physical space belongs, in a
fundamental sense, to the person without whom such information could not
exist, whose travel decisions created the pattern of information and whose
very personality is embodied in the pattern. An anonymous surveillance
system or transportation database that captures those patterns, lacks the
originating individual's claim to ownership.
Surveillance systems that collect and digitize information about a
person's present and past locations and travel patterns are making use of
information that properly belongs to the individual traveler: Use by others of

104. Hill. 865 P.2d at 654.

105.

ALExANDER I. SOlZHENITSYN. CANCER WARD (1968);
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personal information about an individual without the individual's consent
interferes with the individual's information privacy interests. These information privacy interests include both consenting or refusing to consent to
collection of information about one's location and travel, as well as preventing
dissemination or misuse of personal details about one's life and travels.
Dossiers, itineraries, profiles of the places where a person has been,· all
impinge on important information privacy interests of an individual. When
the individual who is the subject of the information has no way of knowing
about or affecting the collection of the information by unseen surveillance
systems, the individual is powerless to affect, much less constrmn, use of the
individual's personal information by invisible users.
Information collected through roadway surveillance can be used to annoy
the individual through targeted marketing and advertizing. Such information
can also be used to harass the individual through stopping and questioning her.
Such information may even be used by stalkers to frighten or even to kill the
individual. Such information can be used by government agencies, including
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to find suspicious individuals for
detention or control. Roadway surveillance information can also be used to
profile individuals, to predict their future actions, and to psychologically
manipulate their choices about where to travel.
The ITS technologies discussed above have a particularly high potential
for affecting information privacy. License plate recognition systems can note
the location of a particular vehicle and keep track of other locations where that
vehicle has appeared over time. Prediction of a person's future movements
can be based on profiles compiled from past archived itineraries. Remote
traffic cameras that capture digital images of individuals and vehicles can
locate a person, whether she is a driver or a passenger or even a pedestrian or
passerby. These digital images can be stored indefinitely for future reference.
Beepers and toll tag transponders can also be used to follow the movements
of a person and pinpoint that person's current location. GPS devices secreted
on a vehicle can keep detailed logs of the times and places of all movements
for later downloading and analysis. Cellular telephone technology's required
automatic location information provides real-time information about the
location of a wireless telecommunication device and its user's movements
from place to place. Archives of individual itineraries derived from all of
these technologies can be used both to associate an individual with locations
the individual frequented in the past, as well as to predict future destinations.
Whenever information about an identified or identifiable person is
collected, information privacy interests are affected. In some ways, ITS
applications can be more mindful of these informational privacy interests than
other types of surveillance because ITS has the advantage of being an
application of intelligent systems. The intelligence of these systems is useful
not only in solving transportation problems, but also in building privacy pro-
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tections into the very architecture of the technologies. For example, an intelligent system can be designed so that it does not collect information about
individuals at all. Alternatively, an intelligent system can be designed to minimize the personal information that is collected and how long the information
is kept, as well as to restrict the availability of the information to others.
When intelligent systems collect individually identifiable information, that
information can be automatically encrypted using strong encryption and
automatically destroyed when a transitory purpose, such as ascertaining realtime traffic speed, is past. Indeed, responsible ITS agencies have required that
privacy protection be built into ITS systems which may affect information
privacy interests. 106
Other not-so-intelligent attempts to do something about privacy will not
work very well. For example, developers of ITS systems designed to collect
and distribute large amounts of personally identifiable information may just
add on privacy protection at the last stage of the design, rather than building
privacy into way the ITS system is organized. When such information privacy
add-ons are pasted onto a surveillance system that maximizes collection and
exposure of personal information, it is quite easy for hackers or intelligence
agencies to circumvent such measures by simply going upstream in the data
flow-after the data is collected but before the privacy protections apply. For
example, a traffic surveillance system that uses license plate recognition to
time vehicles at successive locations to determine traffic speed may eventually
encrypt the digitized license plate information. However, someone else, say
a private investigator or an intelligence agency, can either routinely or in
particular cases reach in and capture the data before it is encrypted. Unauthorized persons, whether a private investigator working a domestic relations case or a stalker bent on mayhem, may also capture information about
particular vehicles associated with targeted people, through such an "upstream" access. The result is unintelligent and ineffective privacy protection.
Fortunately, responsible members of the ITS industry, with assistance
from the Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS-America) the
trade association of the ITS industry, have adopted privacy principles that
recognize the need to protect information privacy as part of ITS -intelligent
systems. These principles urge development of ITS applications that are
designed to protect information privacy froni the ground up. ITS America's
"Intelligent Transportation Systems Fair Information and Privacy Principles"
were "prepared in recognition of the importance of upholding individual

106. For example, the TravInfo traveler infonnation system in the San Francisco Bay area has
embraced significant privacy protections. See 511 Traffic website, at http://traffic.511.orglprivacy.asp(last
visited Aug. 10,2004). See also Adam Clymer, Tracking Bay Area Traffic Creates Concern/or Privacy,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at All.
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privacy in implementing Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). . .. Initiators of ITS projects are urged to publish the fair information and privacy principles that they intend to follow. Parties to ITS are urged to include enforceable provisions for safeguarding privacy in their contracts and agreements." 107
These principles are not perfect protections for information privacy. But they
do recognize the need to respect the information privacy interests of
individuals whose lives may be caught up in ITS systems.
The Panopticon Effect

The collection of personal information by impersonal government and
private-sector roadway surveillance agencies also has political, as well as
psychological and practical dimensions. Authoritarian systems can misuse
information about individuals to round up suspects or to treat people as
undesirables based on where they are or have been. Systems that comprehensively keep track of the whereabouts of each person in all places and at all

107. See Fair Information and Privacy Principles, Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS)
website, at http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:IEpp7uNV2GoJ :www.itsa.orglsubject.nsfl836e8941046
dcc0e852565860062dbOdlc34171 cc9664b456852569430060955a1%24FILElBoard%2520Approved%
2520Privacy%2520Principles.doc+%22prepared+in+recognition+of+the+importance+of+upholding+in
dividual%22&hl=en (last visited Aug. 10,2004). The ITS-America information privacy principles include
the following:
I. INDIVIDUAL CENTERED. Intelligent Transportation Systems must recognize and
respect the individual's interests in privacy and information use.
2. VISmLE. Intelligent Transportation Information Systems will be built in a manner
"visible" to individuals.
3. COMPLY. Intelligent Transportation Systems will comply with applicable state and
federal laws governing privacy and information use.
4. SECURE. Intelligent Transportation Systems will be secure.
5. LAW ENFORCEMENT. Intelligent Transportation Systems have an appropriate role in
enhancing travelers' safety and security interests, but absent consent, statutory authority,
appropriate legal process, or emergency circumstances as defined by law, information
identifying individuals will not be disclosed to law enforcement.
6. RELEVANT. Intelligent Transportation Systems will only collect personal information
that is relevant for ITS purposes.
7. ANONYMITY. Where practicable, individuals should have the ability to utilize
Intelligent Transportation Systems on an anonymous basis.
8. COMMERCIAL OR OTHER SECONDARY USE. Intelligent Transportation Systems
information stripped of personal identifiers may be used for non-ITS applications.
9. FOlA. Federal and State Freedom of Information Act (FOlA) obligations require
disclosure of information from government maintained databases. Database arrangements
should balance the individual's interest in privacy and the public's right to know.
10. OVERSIGHT. Jurisdictions and companies deploying and operating Intelligent
Transportation Systems should have an oversight mechanism to ensure that such deployment
and operation complies with their Fair Information and Privacy Principles.
[d.
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times produce profiles or predictive patterns of where a tracked person is
likely to be found and where that person is likely to go. The destructive
psychological effect of maintaining centralized information about each
individual compromises these individuals' self-determination and autonomy.
As noted above, a person who knows that she is, or can be, constantly
watched is not free. In addition, comprehensive centralized tracking systems
can also use that information to affect the individual's future choices about
where it is "safe" or "not safe" to go. Human nature tends to resist being
categorized, manipulated psychologically, intimidated and mechanistically
predicted by society. But with comprehensive surveillance in place, every
time a person goes from one place to another on public roads, the surveillance
would both take its toll on the individual and also concentrate great power in
those in control of the surveillance. This combination of factors impinging on
individual freedom is the panoptic on effect.
The panoptic on effect is a predictable result of wide-scale comprehensive
surveillance. Indeed, Michel Foucault described "panopticism" as a key
mechanism of centralized social control. \08 The combination of technologies
described in the previous part of this article have the capacity to create a world
in which the panopticon is a reality for those who travel on public roadways.
The pervasiveness of modem roadway surveillance technologies makes it
possible for a central authority to find, to follow and to keep track of nearly
everyone. Almost any individual's movements from place to place can be
tracked without the individual knowing whether or not she is being tracked,
or has been tracked. The realization that such centralized tracking is possible
impresses a profound sense of powerlessness upon an individual and affects
her choices about where, and where not, to go. That is the panopticon effect.
For those concerned about individual privacy, centralized systematic scrutiny
that is ubiquitous as well as covert simply represents too much societal control
over the individual. It makes ordinary drivers feel as if they were prisoners in
Jeremy Bentham's prison, rather than presumptively law-abiding people on
the open road. With roadway surveillance technologies multiplying into so
many avenues of societal control, there appear to be few escape routes for
individual freedom and imagination. The panopticon will have become a
reality when individual choices about where to go and what to do are under
the control of the system.
A century and a half ago, in writing about the Constitutional History of
England, Sir Thomas May noted the problematic consequences of the
panopticon effect:

108. See

FOUCAULT,

supra note 95, at 195-228.
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Next in importance to personal freedom is immunity from suspicions
and jealous observation. Men may be without restraints upon their
liberty; they may pass to and fro at pleasure; but if their steps are
tracked by spies and informers, their words noted down for crimination, their associates watched as conspirators,-who shall say that
they are free? Nothing is more revolting ... than the espionage which
forms part of the administrative system of continental despotisms. It
haunts men like an evil genius, chills their gayety, restrains their wit,
casts a shadow over their friendships, and blights their domestic
hearth. The freedom of a country may be measured by its immunity
from this baleful agency. 109
Modem courts in the United States sometimes sound similar alarms.
In an Oregon decision involving a beeper attached without a warrant to
a burglary suspect's automobile, the Oregon Supreme Court expounded his
state's constitutional right to freedom from technologically advanced scrutiny:
Since 1859 . . . [when the Oregon Constitutional provision was
adopted], the government's ability to scrutinize the affairs of "the
people" has been enhanced by technological and organizational
developments that could not have been foreseen then. Tiny radio
transmitters for surreptitiously locating objects to which the transmitters are attached are among these developments .... Any device that
enables the police quickly to locate a person or object anywhere
within a 40-mile radius, day or night, over a period of several days, is
a significant limitation on freedom from scrutiny .... The limitation
is made more substantial by the fact that the radio transmitter is much
more difficult to detect than would-be observers who must rely upon
the sense of sight. Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of
one's possessions, one can never be sure that one's location is not
being monitored by means of a radio transmitter. Thus, individuals
must more readily assume that they are the objects of government
scrutiny.... [F]reedom may be impaired as much, if not more so, by
the threat of scrutiny as by the fact of scrutiny .... [If no warrant is
necessary for the use of an electronic transmitter], no movement, no
location and no conversation in a "public place" would in any
measure be secure from the prying of the government. There would
in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascertain when they

109. THOMAS E. MAY, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE
THE THIRD 1760-1860 275 (Boston: Crosby & Nichols, 1862-1864), available at http://www.don-aitken.
freeuk.comlemay3v039.html (last visited Aug. 10,2(04).
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were being scrutinized and when they were not. That is nothing short
of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom. I 10
When the Oregon court warned about infringing the right to be free from
scrutiny, it was calling for opposition to the panopticon effect.
In the State of Washington, the supreme court raised similar concerns
about the panopticon effect in a case involving use of GPS devices. The
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the use of the GPS devices because the
devices' installation and use were authorized by judicial warrants. In
discussing the importance of requiring warrants in cases involving such
surveillance technologies, the court warned:
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device
is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal
about an individual's life. For example, the device can provide a
detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling casinos,
tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars,
grocery stores, exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off
for school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the fast
food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the
"wrong" side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally. In
this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places
that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and
foibles .. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus
can provide a detailed picture of one's life....
. . . [U]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive
method of surveillance, making it possible to acquire an enormous
amount of personal information about the citizen under circumstances
where the individual is unaware that every single vehicle trip taken
and the duration of every single stop may be recorded by the government.
We conclude that the citizens of this State have a right to be free
from the type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS
device is attached to a citizen's vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy
expectations due to advances in technology. I I I
The Washington Supreme Court appears to share the Oregon court's call for
resistance to the panopticon effect.

110. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048-1049 (Or. 1988)
111. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. 2003).
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The panopticon effect has been a longstanding concern of those interested in promoting technological progress and security. Advocates of technology, as well as privacy advocates, share concerns about the impact of such
technologies on human personality and privacy. Technology advocates are
worried that the panopticon effect will erode trust in and generate restrictions
on roadway surveillance technologies. On the other hand, privacy advocates
are concerned about controlling surveillance technologies so that they do not
have undesirable personal or political consequences.
More than thirty years ago in United States v. White, 112 a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court upheld the use of wired informers as not a
search or seizure. But two of the dissenting Justices warned about the
consequences of not paying attention to the panopticon effect. Justice Harlan,
dissenting, insisted on the need for "assessing the nature of a particular
practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security
balanced against the utility of the .. , technique of law enforcement." I 13 In
his dissenting opinion in White, Justice Harlan felt that the law enforcement
technology involved in that case had too great an impact on the individual's
sense of security. In his dissenting opinion in White, Justice Douglas more
dramatically warned about the tyranny of technology over humanity. Justice
Douglas admonished, "Today no one perhaps notices because only a small,
obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the
technology we exalt today is everyman's master.,,114
It is important to carefully consider privacy interests before deploying
roadway surveillance technologies that can compromise individual privacy
and result in a panopticon effect. Indeed, there is a history of adverse public
response to government programs designed to collect information about
individuals. When these surveillance systems appear to be building blocks
toward the construction of a surveillance panopticon, public and political
outrage is likely. 115 It is important for those who believe that technology is not

112. 401 u.s. 745 (1971).
113. [d. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. [d. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
115. For example, negative public response doomed the Department of Defense's infamous "Total
Information Awareness"office, even as it was later reconstituted as the "Terrorism Information Awareness"
program. See discussion supra notes 9-11.
Other similar data collection projects are the Justice Department's Matrix (Multistate
Antiterrorism Information Exchange) program and the Transponation Security Agency's CAPPS II. With
regard to Matrix, see Black, supra note 10. Apparently only Florida, Michigan, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
and Ohio continue to cooperate with the program. Schwanz, supra note 10. With regard to CAPPS II, an
updated version of the existing airpon screening program, Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System, see Behar, supra note II. Concerns about the privacy of screening information has caused
repeated delays in the launch of CAPPS II. See, e.g., Venon, supra note 11; Wald, supra note 11.
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incompatible with privacy to assure that the many new forms of roadway
surveillance do not loom over the nation's highways like a panopticon.

N.

LEGAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVACY ON THE OPEN ROAD

Courts and legislatures across the United States are keenly aware ofthe
privacy interests discussed in the previous part of this article. BalanCing what
is properly protected as private against what needs to be public in a roadway
setting is often difficult. As a result, decision makers usually recognize that
roadway privacy protections are virtually never absolute, but rather depend on
particular circumstances. As courts and legislatures balance both individual
and societal concerns in determining whether a particular type of roadway
surveillance requires restriction for privacy reasons, they often focus on larger
societal implications, such as the panopticon effect. When roadway S\lrveillance appears to result in overwhelming societal control over individuals,
privacy interests are most likely to prevail in both public policy and legal
determinations.
In many cases, the balance between what is appropriately private and
what is necessarily public on the road is expressed in terms of reasonable
expectations of privacy, a concept that will be examined first. Then Fourth
Amendment restrictions on stopping vehicles on roadways will be contrasted
with Fourth Amendment tolerance of tracking people on roads and highways.
After considering some of the cases imposing tort liability for interfering with
the privacy of people on roadways, this discussion of legal protections for
privacy on the.open road will conclude with a look at some specific statutes
enacted to protect roadway privacy against surveillance technologies.
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy on the Open Road

Legal protections for privacy, both on the open road and elsewhere, are
often described in terms of reasonable expectations of privacy. "Reasonable
expectations of privacy" usually expresses a conclusion that an individual's
privacy interests outweigh the interests of society. Although most commonly
used in deciding whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonable
expectations of privacy concept also appears more broadly in other types of
privacy laws, including tort, state constitutional protections and even privacy
legislation. Whether reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is useful in
considering privacy protections on roads and highways is a deeper question
about which there is substantial disagreement.
Analysis of privacy cases in terms of "reasonable expectations of privacy" is based on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
a case involving privacy claims that surreptitiously recorded conversations
from a public phone booth should be suppressed. The majority opinion by
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Justice Stewart rejected earlier interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that
limited its protections to instances where government agents had trespassed
on property interests of the person claiming Fourth Amendment protection.
In ruling that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places," 116 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the older property-based limitations
that had routinely withheld Fourth Amendment protections from people in
public places, such as roads and highways.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz added that decisions whether
or not the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements
should apply at all require consideration of two separate issues: "My
~nderstanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a twofold requirement, ftrst that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. "'117 Although Justice
Harlan continued to believe that the place where a person is located is relevant
in such an analysis, he insisted that even in public places there are areas where
"occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable."118 Over the years Justice Harlan's two-fold reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis morphed from an inquiry whether an expectation of privacy
was subjectively and objectively "reasonable"119 into similar inquiries into
whether such the privacy expectation was "j ustiftable" I 20 or "legitimate" I 21 or
. sometimes all three. 122
Reasonable expectations of privacy analysis does not work very well in
considering privacy interests in public roadway contexts. A person on a road
seems, almost by deftnition·, to lack both the subjective and objective elements
of a reasonable expectation of privacy. And yet, there are numerous instances
where the privacy of people on public roads has been protected by law.
Protecting privacy on public roadways is a feature of search and seizure
decisions as well as of applications of state constitutional privacy guarantees.
Damage actions for intrusion on the privacy of people on roads and highways

116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967). Although Katz was in a public place, the Court
insisted that "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." /d.
117. [d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. [d. (Harlan, J., concurring).
119. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. "Justifiable" was the chosen privacy-expectation modifier in the plurality opinion in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which also used "reasonable" and "legitimate" as adjectives. See also
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
121. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (discussing the legitimacy of privacy
expectations). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,540 (2001).
122. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 315 (1987).
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are also possible. Moreover, such privacy claims are reflected in legislation
designed to rein in surveillance technologies used on public roadways. It is
possible to construe these legal privacy protections for privacy on the open
road as just reflections of subjectively and objectively reasonable expectations
of privacy. But such a reasonable expectations of privacy analysis does not
reach the deeper questions of whether and when privacy ought to be protected
in this setting.
When the privacy of people on public roads is legally protected, two
types of factors are usually important: context factors and consequence
factors. First, the context in which the issue of protecting privacy is raised is
important. In court cases, the procedural context is also significant. For
example, whether privacy protection is at issue with regard to suppression of
a particular item of evidence in a criminal prosecution is a different procedural
context from deciding whether stopping people on highways should be a
routine law enforcement practice. Protecting privacy is more likely in the
latter type of context. For both courts and legislatures, the factual context,
such as how a particular type of surveillance works, and whether surveillance
is covert or visible, are also important factors.
Second, the consequences of protecting or not protecting individual
privacy in terms of government or private-sector power over an individual are
likely to partly determine when the privacy of people on roads and highways
should be protected. Ultimately, the overriding issue in these roadway situations focuses on how much societal power over individuals is tolerable. A
certain degree of societal control is to be expected, because the open road is
a setting where individuals and society interact. But too much societal control
stifles individual freedom. Finding an appropriate balance is crucial.
Somehow mechanically applying reasonable expectations of privacy analysis
seems to obscure this vital point.
Critics of reasonable expectations of privacy analysis come from many
different directions. Not all reasonable expectations of privacy critics favor
protecting privacy of people on open roads. Perhaps the most acerbic of such
critics is Justice Scalia, who complains that the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test lacks any "plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment," and is also "self-indulgent." 123 He scoffs that, "[U]nsurprisingly, those
'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' 'that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable,' ... bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.,,124
Even Justice Harlan, who originated reasonable expectations of privacy
analysis, later became concerned about its meaningfulness. Four years after

123. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, I., concurring).
124. [d. (Scalia, I., concurring) (quoting in part Katz, 389 u.S. at 361).

HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 334 2004

2004]

OPEN ROAD

335

concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan dissented in White, a case in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the use of a surreptitiously wired
informer did not infringe any reasonable expectation of privacy:
While ["reasonable expectation of privacy"] [ ] formulations
represent an advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the
common law, they too have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead
to the substitution of words for analysis. The analysis must, in my
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal
attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules
the customs and values of the past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as
mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under
our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement. 125
Undesirable consequences in terms of too much government control over
individuals seemed to Justice Harlan to be more important than whether or not
people expect that those with whom they talk may be wired informers. For
Justice Harlan the real issue was whether or not wired informers were to
become an acceptable feature of life in the United States. Justice Harlan
thought they should not. That is why he dissented in White.
More recently, Justice O'Connor in her majority opinion for the Court in
Indianapolis v. Edmond,126 a case involving drug-interdiction roadblocks,
discussed below, also reflected a similar uneasiness with reasonable expectations of privacy analysis. In fact she avoided even mentioning reasonable
expectations of privacy in ruling:
Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve
the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do
little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American Life ....

125. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
126. 531 u.s. 32 (2000).
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... We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized
and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. 127
For Justice O'Connor, the issue was not whether Edmond's expectation of
privacy on the highway outside Indianapolis was or was not reasonable.
Rather,the issue for Justice O'Connor was the consequences, in particular the
type of society fostered by tolerating such a practice of law enforcement
routinely stopping law-abiding motorists on the chance that such motorists
might be engaged in wrongdoing. She was particularly concerned about
preventing the development of a society in which people on roads are forced
to assume that they will be routinely stopped by law enforcement without any
reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing.
Other jurists have also criticized application of reasonable expectations
of privacy analysis to on-the-road contexts from a different perspective. For
example, in a series of decisions, the Oregon Supreme Court expressed doubts
about ureasonable expectations of privacy" analysis in interpreting state
constitutional protections against illegal searches. 128 In one of these decisions,
involving warrantless use of a beeper, Justice Lent bluntly held:
Because the ["reasonable expectations of privacy"] phrase continues
to appear so often in arguments, we hereby expressly reject it for
defining searches under [the Oregon Constitution's provisions regarding searches and seizures]. . .. The phrase becomes a formula for
expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis,
masking the various substantive considerations that are the real bases
on which Fourth Amendment Searches are defined .... [The privacy
protected by the Oregon Constitution] is not the privacy that one
reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a right. 129
Having banished expectations of privacy analysis, the court determined that
the Oregon Constitutional right to privacy is violated when police install a
tracking device on a vehicle without a warrant.
These judicial opinions, as well as numerous statutes enacted to protect
roadway privacy, seek to redirect attention to the societal consequences of
protecting the privacy interests of people on the open road. Rather than
quibbling about whether such expectations of privacy are subjectively and/or
objectively reasonable, these opinions confront the basic issue whether a
privacy interest deserves protection in the particular context of roads and

127. Edmond. 531 U.S. at 43-44.
128. State v. Tanner. 745 P.2d 757.762 n.7 (Or. 1987); State v. Louis. 672 P.2d 708. 710 (Or. 1983).
129. State v. Campbell. 759 P.2d 1040. 1044 (Or. 1988) (emphasis in original).
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highways. Their focus is on assessing the extent to which social control over
individuals-whether from Big Brother, Big Sister, the gang of little brothers
or some combination of them - is tolerable.
Stopping a Vehicle on the Open Road is a Seizure
Concerns about contexts and consequences of privacy claims, rather than
whether expectations of privacy are reasonable, are clearly reflected in recent
United States Supreme Court decisions holding that stopping a vehicle on a
road or highway is a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 130 In
two recent decisions,131 the United States Supreme Court has required that
when law enforcement agents stop vehicles on roadways, these agents must
have very good reasons for doing so. As a theoretical matter, there remains
an underlying question whether such vehicle stops should occur only in
exceptional cases (currently the view of the majority of the Court) or whether
vehicle stops should be acceptable as a general rule (currently the view of a
minority of the Justices). Insistence that government power over individuals
needs to be limited and assiduously prevented from overwhelming individual
freedom is part of the underlying explanation for the majority's insistence on
protecting privacy on the open road from too many law enforcement stops,
roadblocks, checkpoints, and the like.
Law enforcement interest in roadways goes back many centuries. 132
Modern efforts to capture criminal suspects on public roadways intensified
early in the twentieth century, with the advent of the automobile and paved
highways. When Prohibition l33 became the law of the land, law enforcement
agents began to look for bootleggers transporting illegal alcohol. During this
time, the United States Supreme Court upheld a wide range of law enforcement surveillance technologies such as wiretaps aimed at enforcing Prohibition.134 Stopping bootleggers on the highways to thwart distribution of illegal
alcohol was among them. 135

130. TIlinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
131. [d.; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
132. The so-called nightwalker statutes in England, beginning with the Statute of Winchester, 13
Edw.1, Stat. 2, ch.4 (1285), were among the precursors of twentieth-century vagrancy laws, struck down
on void-for-vagueness grounds in such cases as Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) and
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Local anti-cruising ordinances, such as that
upheld in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990), are more modem manifestations of law
enforcement concerns about roadways. See also, ROGER D. McGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN AND
VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER (1984).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. xvm (ratified 1919, repealed 1933). Roadway surveillance of course
continued even after Prohibition was repealed in 1933 by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified 1933).
134. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
135. Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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In the first of the Prohibition-era automobile search and seizure cases,
Carroll v. United States, 136 the same United States Supreme Court that would
later uphold warrantless wiretapping of bootleggers, approved warrantless
stopping and searching of cars suspected of containing contraband whiskey.
Nevertheless the Court's opinion in Carroll took pains to recognize that
people on public highways retain certain privacy rights. Chief Justice Taft's
opinion for the Court characterized as "intolerable and unreasonable"
authorizing law enforcement agents "to stop every automobile ... and thus
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and
indignity of such a search." 137 Chief Justice Taft expressed particular concern
about the rights of those using the public highways "to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise.',I38 Although the Supreme Court held that
the particular automobile searches and seizures involved in Carroll were
lawful, the Court noted that there might well be constitutional objections to
wholesale tracking of individuals on public roadways. In other words,
following and stopping and searching a particular suspect was permissible.
But broad scale surveillance designed to stop everyone on a public road would
be "intolerable and unreasonable."
That principle of not allowing government to stop anyone and everyone
on the open road continues to playa significant role in evaluating the legality
of stopping vehicles on roads and highways. This principle echoes classic
notions of limited government l39 in insisting that courts and citizens ought to
be skeptical about giving government too much power over individuals. It
also reflects concerns about the panopticon effect noted above. Such wariness
about the consequences of a too powerful government plays a particularly
important role in two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
cases involving stopping vehicles on public roads.
.
The first of these decisions, Edmond, involved a narcotics checkpoint
seeking to interdict illegal drugs. Police stopped all vehicles passing along a
road into Indianapolis, examined each vehicle's exterior with a drug-sniffing
dog, but did not search the interiors of the vehicles. The legal context of the
Edmond decision was somewhat unusual for a search and seizure case,

136. 267 U.s. 132 (1925).
137. [d. at 153-54.
138. [d. at 154.
139. One of the most notable exponents of theories of constitutiona1limitations was Thomas Cooley,
whose A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION was a mainstay of nineteenth century American
constitutional theory after the Civil War. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATION WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
(Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1868).
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because it involved neither the suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution nor the so-called automobile exception to Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirements for vehicle searches. Rather, Edmond was brought as a
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, by two
ordinary motorists who had been stopped at the Indianapolis narcotics
checkpoint. On behalf of all those stopped at such checkpoints, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the program that, without any suspicion of
wrongdoing, seized their vehicles and themselves. l40 Because the case was
brought as a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief, only the general
program of stopping vehicles, rather than any particular seizure or search of
a suspect, was at issue before the Supreme Court. The consequences of protecting the privacy rights of motorists in general in these circumstances were
the Court's main focus. "Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment
would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American life," Justice O'Connor ruled. 141 As a routine program of suspicionless seizures by law enforcement agents for general law enforcement
purposes, the roadblocks were constitutionally intolerable. Justice 0' Connor's
opinion for the Court ruled that, because such roadblocks constituted routine
suspicionless seizures justified only by the municipality's general interest in
crime control, such seizures violated the Fourth Amendment.
The unusual context of this class action which was before the Court on
stipulated facts, focused attention on the program of vehicle stops in general,
not any particular stop. The six-justice majority struck down such routine narcotics checkpoints along Indianapolis roads as an unconstitutional intrusion.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment's "general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of
individualized suspicion" rendered the roadblock program unconstitutional. 142
"When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control
purposes at checkpoints such as here ... stops can only be justified by some
quantum of individualized suspicion.,,143 The opinion does not discuss any
particular intrusion caused by the Indianapolis roadblocks at length other than
to characterize the interferences as indiscriminate and not based on suspicions
of wrongdoing.

140. The plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied by the United States District
Court. But the Seventh Circuit reversed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The case
came before the United States Supreme Court on stipulated facts.
141. Edmond. 531 U.S. at 42.
142. [d. at 41.
143. [d. at 47.
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Much·of the majority opinion in Edmond is devoted to distinguishing
other types of constitutionally permissible roadblock seizures, such as
sobriety 144 and bOrder 145 checkpoints, which the United States Supreme Court
has upheld as constitutional. The Court characterized each of these roadblock
or checkpoint programs as based on a specific reason or purpose that set each
of these particular types of vehicle stops apart from the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription that such intrusions are unconstitutional unless based on
an individualized suspicion, According to Edmond, ''The constitutionality of
such [other types of] checkpoint programs" require balancing "the competing
interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program."I46 But as a general
rule, "suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme" of law enforcement are unreasonable even without balancing the competing interests of the
government and individual. 147 What the Court protected in Edmond was the
general principle that everyone, in particular people on public roads, have
constitutionally protected rights to be let alone by the government. Under the
Constitution, law enforcement is not normally permitted to routinely stop
people on roads and highways without a reasonable suspicion. 148
Edmond insists on the principle that people have the right to be left alone
on public roads unless (a) the government has a reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity or (b) the government is justified in intruding on everyone because of
a particularly vital government program. Without a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing, intrusions on the privacy of people in public places is presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional unless one of a very limited set of
exceptions applies, such as preventing people from driving under the influence
of drugs or alcohol or enforcing immigration laws. The Edmond decision

144. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
145. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The discretion of border agents to search
vehicles for contraband was recently extended in United States v. Flores·Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004),
which upheld removal and dismantling of a vehicle's fuel tank in searching for illegal drugs at an
international border crossing.
146. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
147. [d.
148. One interesting feature of the majority opinion is how little it has to say about privacy. Aside
from a single reference, when mentioning the Court's earlier decision in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.
334 (2000) that had recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to carry-on luggage in the
overhead compartment of a bus, the majority opinion does not use the word privacy at all. [d. Rather, the
opinion discusses such a roadblock as an intrusion, without discussing privacy expectations that a person
will not be stopped at a law enforcement checkpoint without a reasonable, focused suspicion that they have
done something illegal. An example of a stop based on a reasonable suspicion is the stop in Atwater v. City
o/Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), an action brought under§ 1983 against a law enforcement agency and
officer, in which the ~ourt upheld a warrantless arrest of a woman for misdemeanor seat belt violations
which the arresting police officer observed. [d.
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articulates a general rule that law enforcement seizures of vehicles are presumptively unreasonable absent a targeted suspicion regarding individual
wrongdoing or justification in terms of a critical need, such as controlling
illegal immigration or excluding drivers under the influence of alcohol or
drugs from highways. Without the peculiar contexts involved in these exceptions, stopping people on public roadways is an unconstitutional seizure.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Edmond, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, argues for an opposite general rule. According
to the dissent, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy that one will not
be stopped by the police along public roads. The dissent claims that properly
regulated law enforcement roadblock stops of automobiles are presumptively
reasonable and result in "only minimal intrusion on the privacy of their
occupants.,,149 According to the dissent, people in public places should reasonably expect intrusion from government. On public roadways, people can
be stopped by law enforcement as a general rule. For this proposition, the
dissent relies primarily on two precedents, Michigan Dep 't of State Police v.
Sitz l50 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 151 both of which upheld certain
roadblocks as constitutional. The dissent asserts that these decisions embody
a general rule that roadblock stops are routinely acceptable. These are the
very same decisions that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Edmond
carefully distinguishes as exceptions to an opposite general rule that suspicionless roadblock stops are ordinarily not acceptable.
Edmond displays a stark contrast between the views of the majority and
those of the dissent regarding whether there is a presumption of privacy on the
open road. The majority rules that there is a constitutionally significant
intrusion when law enforcement routinely interferes with individuals on public
roads. In contrast, the dissent insists that when an individual is on a public
road, the Fourth Amendment requires only that the government have a
reasonable, nondiscriminatory program for intrusions. At one point the
dissent asserts, ''The only difference between this case and Sitz is the presence
of the dog [that sniffed the exterior of the plaintiff's car in Edmondl."152 In
a footnote, the majority opinion retorts that the dog-sniff of the exterior of the
stopped vehicles is not why the roadblocks are unconstitutional. Rather, "the
constitutional defect of the program is that its primary purpose is to advance
the general interest in crime control.,,153 The fundamental disagreement

149. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent asserts that roadblocks cause
only minimal intrusions on privacy. See id. (Rehnquist, C.l., dissenting).
150. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
151. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
152. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52 (Rehnquist, C.l., dissenting).
153. [d. at 44 n.1.
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between the majority and dissent is with regard to whether people in our
society can require that law enforcement roadblocks will not, absent limited
exceptional circumstances, intrude on them as they travel on public roads. It
is not the dog that makes the difference in Edmond. What makes the
difference is the majority's view that people have a right to be left alone as
they travel from place to place. The general rule of the road is that the government will not interfere with law-abiding travelers without a strong justification. Justifications for interferences must be more specific than just a general
interest in crime control.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas focused on the issue
dividing the majority and dissent-whether or not suspicionless law enforcement stops should be considered a general rule of the road. Justice Thomas's
opinion noted that he agreed with the dissent that under Sitz and MartinezFuerte, properly regulated suspicionless roadblock seizures appear to be
permitted as a general rule. But Justice Thomas's dissent importantly adds
that he is not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided.
He suggests that, absent these precedents, the appropriate interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment may well be the majority's general rule of privacy on
public roads: "Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops
of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.,,154 But because the issue of
overruling Sitz and Martinez-Fuente had not been raised, much less briefed or
argued, Justice Thomas did not think overruling these decisions was wise in
Edmond. Justice Thomas's separate dissenting opinion signals that in Edmond
there was a seventh Justice who believes that, as a general rule, people on
public highways should not have to put up with suspicionless roadblocks for
general law enforcement purposes.
These issues returned to the Court in Illinois v. Lidster,155 in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an informational
police checkpoint. The Court again reinforced the message of Edmond that
as a general rule law-abiding motorists have a right not to be stopped for
general law enforcement purposes in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing. In Lidster, local police had set up an "informational" checkpoint
late on a Saturday night to obtain information from motorists about a hit-andrun accident that had resulted in the death of a 70-year-old bicyclist the week
before at about the same location and time of night. At the checkpoint,
officers stopped each vehicle for 10 to 15 seconds, asked the occupants
whether they had seen what had happened there the previous weekend, and
handed each driver a flyer describing the accident and requesting information

154. [d. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

ISS. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
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about it. One of the stopped drivers was Lidster whose minivan swerved and
nearly hit an officer. Smelling alcohol on Lidster's breath, the officer directed
him to an area where another officer administered a sobriety test, after which
Lidster was arrested for drunk driving. Convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol, Lidster challenged his conviction on the ground that an
illegal checkpoint stop had been used to gather evidence against him in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The lllinois Supreme Court held that, under Edmond, the stop and the
arrest that resulted from it were unconstitutional. But the United States
Supreme Court upheld Lidster's conviction and distinguished Edmond on the
grounds that Lidster was detained, not at a general law enforcement checkpoint, but rather at a "brief, information-seeking highway" stop. In these
circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the seizure was justified. In
making this determination, the Court applied the standards of Brown v.
Texas,156 a case that had considered law enforcement questioning of pedestrians. 157 Three justices suggested that the case should have been remanded for
the lllinois courts to apply the Brown standards.
According to Justice Breyer's opinion for the majority, the importance
and effectiveness of police seeking the help of the public in solving a serious
crime and the minor delays and lack of intrusiveness caused by the informational checkpoint stop justified the Court's conclusion that the informational
stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The unanimous Court in Lidster
explained that "in judging reasonableness, we look to 'the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.",158 These standards are explicitly based on Brown 159
where the Court held unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment the prosecution of a pedestrian in an alley who refused to identify himself to police.

156. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
157. [d. The Court held that "[i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant [Brown] of

misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy
tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." [d. at 52. The Court described three factors to be used
in determining that balance: "Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing
of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." [d. at 50-51.
158. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).
159. [d. In Lidster, Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court refers to the AU, Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure section 110.1(1) (I975) ("[L]aw enforcement officer may ... request any person
to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime"), and Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) ("[I]nterrogation of witnesses ... is undoubtedly an essential tool in
effective law enforcement"); as well as U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement 14-15 (I999) (instructing law enforcement to gather information from witnesses near the
scene). [d.
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In a later decision interpreting Brown, the Court explained in Florida v:
Royer, 160 that the Constitution ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary
cooperation of members of the public in investigating a crime: "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he
is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen .... "161 In other words, even though stopping
people is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment, such stops can be
justified when police make simple police inquiries in criminal investigations.
In Lidster, Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court reinforces Edmond's
rulings that "an involuntary stop [of a vehicle] amounts to a 'seizure' in
Fourth Amendment terms," and requires that such stops be evaluated with
regard to their reasonableness based on the individual circumstances of each
stop.162 Referring to other types of roadblocks allowed under Sitz (upholding
a sobriety checkpoint) and Martinez-Fuerte (upholding a Border Patrol
checkpoint), the Court found that the factors suggested in Brown also applied
to informational police checkpoints. But the Court also made clear "[t]hat
does not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional.
It simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances.,,163 This portion of
Justice Breyer's opinion for a unanimous Court in Lidster seems to settle the
debate between the majority and dissent in Edmond over the general rule that
people on the open road have the right not to be stopped by law enforcement,
subject to a few specific exceptions. The general rule of the road remains a
right not to be stopped absent a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.l64
Justice Breyer's opinion also avoids Justice Thomas's concerns by not overruling Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz. Rather, Justice Breyer places these decisions
upholding certain roadblocks as lawful in a larger context, as Justice
O'Connor had done in Edmond. In this larger context, roadblocks have to be
justified under the standards established in Brown.
Together, Lidster and Edmond suggest that stopping vehicles on roadways is presumptively unconstitutional, but nevertheless subject to a balancing
analysis that takes into account the importance of public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and

160. 460 U.s. 491 (1983).
161. [d. at 497.
162. Lidster. 124 s. Ct. at 890.
163. [d.

164. In Atwater v. City of /Ago Vista. 532 U.s. 318 (2001). the Court had held that stopping a
motorist who was violating seatbelt laws was proper and that she could be arrested and jailed even though
her crime was only a misdemeanor. [d.
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the severity of interference with individual liberty. 165 In unanimously ruling
that vehicle stops are seizures, the Court endorsed a general rule that people
on public roads have a right to be left alone, unless the government has very
good reasons for interfering. Although Justice Breyer wryly noted that, "The
Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle," the Court
required "special law enforcement concerns" before vehicles can be lawfully
stopped. l66 He also held that such concerns would only "sometimes justify
highway stops without individualized suspicion.,,167
Decisions by state courts regarding vehicle stops have also protected
privacy interests of travelers along public roadways. Among the most important is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v.
Whitmyer. 168 This suppression of evidence case involved the stop of a
motorist who, police alleged, had made erratic lane changes, but had not
violated traffic or other laws. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court insisted on
"the privacy interest of the individual" in public circumstances. Quoting from
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse 169 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:

"An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose
all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile
and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel
is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to
and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people
spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the
streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel." 170
In the search and seizure context, whether with regard to suppression of
evidence issues or suits to enjoin government intrusions, privacy along public
roadways is generally protected against suspicionless stops.
Being out in public on a highway exposes an individual to being noticed
by others, including law enforcement. However, the consequences of allowing law enforcement to stop any vehicle without either suspicion of wrongdoing or special law enforcement concerns runs the risk of overwhelming the
privacy rights of individuals with too much social control. Even jurists who

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890.
[d. at 889.
[d. at 889 (emphasis added).

668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995).
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Whitmyer, 668 A.2d at 1117 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662).
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describe privacy on the open road as diminished or minimal, do not claim that
it is nonexistent. Traditional concerns about curbing the potential for arbitrary
exercise of government power apply. As Justice Brandeis noted in a different
context, "The makers of our Constitution . .. conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.,,171 Public roads are omnipresent
aspects of people's lives. To require a complete waiver of Fourth Amendment
privacy interests as an automatic consequence of using them would cede too
much control over too important an area of life to government discretion.
Other social consequences of on-road activities, such as public safety and
solving crime are of course also important. So courts seek a balance that is
neither all privacy nor all law enforcement in insisting that when law enforcement stops a vehicle on a roadway, the stop must be based on an important
justification.
Open Roads as Open Fields?

Federal Law Regarding Tracking People
Tracking people and vehicles on the road raises very different
. constitutional issues from the vehicle stops discussed above. Some might
even assert that such tracking raises no constitutional issues at all. As a result,
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to roadway privacy
appears to split right down the middle: On one side, recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, discussed above, have made clear that Fourth
Amendment protection regarding seizures precludes stopping people and
vehicles a highway without sufficient justification. On the other side, the
protection regarding searches in that same Fourth Amendment appears to not
apply at all when those saIne people and vehicles are tracked, but not stopped,
on those same highways. This anomaly is worth close examination.
In general, Fourth Amendment limitations on law enforcement agents'
tracking, as well as searching, vehicles on public roads are very lenient. This
Federal Constitutional tolerance is often expressed in terms of exposure:
Information exposed to general public perception appears to be fair game for
law enforcement. Even technologically sophisticated surveillance is permitted
if law enforcement could have collected similar information by physical
surveillance and visual following. When automated technologies, such as
GPS, collect much more detailed information than would have been available
using visual surveillance, courts usually allow such tracking. They tend to
find such tracking of it not to constitute a search at all for the purposes of the

171. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (involving
wiretapping without a warrant).
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Fourth Amendment. They typically posit that if, in a perfect world with
unlimited numbers of law enforcement agents with keen senses and limitless
stamina available, these theoretical law enforcement agents could have
collected the information by visual surveillance, then law enforcement use of
automated surveillance technologies to collect such information is not
constitutionally significant. Moreover, because courts often find that there is
a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of those in automobiles, 172 the
fact that such surveillance is of a vehicle also often helps to justify searching
by tracking as legal under federal law .173
The Fourth Amendment treatment of tracking vehicles on open roads is
an extrapolation of the open fields doctrine articulated by Justice Holmes in
United States v. Hester,174 a case involving a jug, a jar and a bottle of illegal
moonshine whiskey that were found outside the defendant's father's house:
"[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law.,,175 This territorial view of the applicability of Fourth Amendment
warrant and probable cause requirements, known as the open fields doctrine,
persists despite rejection of place as determinative of Fourth Amendment
rights in Katz.
The open fields doctrine gradually developed into an open-to-observation
standard,176 although the early rulings did not define what would count as an
open field, nor did they involve surveillance. Courts simply ruled that
observing something out in the open is a non-event for the purposes of Fourth
Amendment search limitations. For example, in Oliver v. United States, 177 a
case involving outdoor marijuana cultivation behind locked gates and "no
trespassing" signs, the United States Supreme Court discussed the open fields
doctrine and interpreted it to mean that even when law enforcement agents
ignored locked gates and no-trespassing signs that would likely have kept out
most members of the public, "government's intrusion upon the open fields is

172. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979)(collects a number of the early cases). See also
Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Rakas v. illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
173. The treatment of automobiles as specially justifying searches because they are mobile dates back
to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
174. 265 U.S. 57 (1924)
175. Id. at 59 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 223, 225-26).
176. Justice Douglas applied this doctrine in an environmental enforcement case. See Air Pollution
Variance Bd. of Colorado v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
177. 466 U.S. 170(1984).
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not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth
Amendment.,,178 According to the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley,179 a
case involving helicopter observations of marijuana cultivation, visual
surveillance is permissible to the extent that what was gathered by law
enforcement surveillance could also have been seen by the public: "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." 180 This decision, like many other open fields rulings,
does not address roadways, nor does it require that anything had actually been
seen by others. Rather it focuses on a hypothetical calculation about what
might have been seen, had anyone tried to look. Courts have also ruled that
what is theoretically not visible to public view because it is inside a home
cannot be surveiled without probable cause and a warrant. In Kyllo v. United
States,181 the United States Supreme Court held that warrantless use of
infrared sensors to capture patterns of heat generated within a home by
marijuana-growing violated the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, even when
one is in a public place, the open-to-visual-observation rule does not apply to
non-visual surveillance. In Bond v. United States, 182 tactile (rather than visual)
investigation of a bag in the luggage rack of a public bus was determined to
be a search under the Fourth Amendment, even though other people on the bus
could also have discovered the contents of the bag by feeling it. The nonvisual search was held to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, even
though what was searched was out in public on an intercity bus. The search
was apparently not subject to the open fields doctrine, which would have
made the search a non-event under the Fourth Amendment, because the
information collected was non-visual in nature.
The anomalous status of roadway surveillance is largely the result of a
pair of United States Supreme Court decisions in the early 1980s involving the
use of beepers: United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo. These two
decisions established that the Fourth Amendment does not generally constrain
law enforcement use of electronic tracking devices on the open road.
Although the devices at issue in these cases were primitive beepers, the rules
set forth in these cases have been applied to all sorts of far more sophisticated
tracking devices, such as GPS devices, cell phones and telematics.

178. [d. at 177 (relying on Hester, 265 U.S. at 57).
179. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
180. [d. at 449 (citingCallfomia v. Ciraol0,476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katzv. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967».
181. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
182. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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In 1983, the United States Supreme Court evaluated law enforcement use
of beepers in Knotts, in which a beeper was used to snare suspected illegal
drug manufacturers. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that, in certain
instances, pervasive use of such devices on a general basis might become
problematic, but concluded that "if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable."183 After Knotts, tracking signals from beepers and transponders
has not generally required a warrant, because such tracking is not a search for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. No such dragnet has been perceived
so far.
On occasions when a physical trespass (such as breaking into a garage)
is necessary to attach a beeper to a surveillance target's vehicle, some
jurisdictions require warrants for the installation of electronic devices. 184
Moreover, in Karo,185 decided a year after the Knotts decision, the United
States Supreme Court limited the use of tracking devices to areas outside the
home. According to the Court's opinion in Karo, monitoring a beeper
becomes a search under the Fourth Amendment when it reveals "a critical fact
about the interior" of a home that could not have been obtained by visual
surveillance. 186 This home exception to otherwise lawful technologically
enhanced searches was held to be consistent with the outdoors open-toobservation rule noted in its later Kyllo decision. 187
Approval of the use of beepers in tracking criminal suspects on roads and
highways appears to follow the following bifurcated analysis: (i) If ordinary
physical surveillance could have tracked a vehicle that is outside a house,
electronic assistance in following that vehicle does not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment. (ii) If the vehicle enters a home, tracking it is
always a search requiring probable cause and a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment. In other words, even when visual surveillance is lost or when
sophisticated electronic tracking devices ate used in circumstances where
visual surveillance is not possible (perhaps because law enforcement agents
do not even know the general vicinity of the vehicle or suspect), the open-to-

183. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 284 (1983). The increasing routine use of tracking
technologies described earlier in this article raises questions about whether the growing web of routine
roadway surveillance is in fact becoming just such a dragnet.
184. United States v. Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation,
Monitoring, Maintaining, Repairing, & Removing of Elec. Transmitting Devices & Infra-Red Tracking
Devices on or Within a White Ford Truck, 155 F.R.O. 401 (0. Mass. 1994).
185. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).
186. [d. at 715.
187. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (involving use of an infrared device to detect heat patterns in portions of
a home used for growing marijuana).
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observation rule allows tracking as long as what is tracked remains outside of
a home. 188 When the log and recording functions of GPS devices provide
different, and far more detailed records than visual surveillance could ever
have provided, the same rule that what is out in the open can be tracked by
technology continues to be applied by federal courts. For example, in United
States v. McIver, 189 a case from Montana involving marijuana cultivation in
a National Forest, the Ninth Circuit upheld the warrantless placement and use
of electronic tracking devices on the undercarriage of McIver's Toyota
4Runner parked in McIver's driveway. The vehicle was then tracked to a
marijuana patch in the national forest where automatic cameras photographed
the defendant harvesting marijuana.
In the federal courts,just the possibility of being seen, rather than the fact
of being seen by law enforcement agents is all that is necessary to avoid
Fourth Amendment search restrictions. What law enforcement officials could
have perceived with their ordinary senses from and in public locations is not
considered a search at all. Camera surveillance of public places is usually
justified on this basis as it was in McIver. 19o Moreover, the line of cases
upholding license plate recognition as not impinging on reasonable
expectations of privacy191 of people on roadways also follows this pattern of
analysis.
After the Knotts and Karo decisions, the Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) amending the original
electronic surveillance statute, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act. The ECPA enacted two specific provisions with regard to electronic
tracking devices. First, communications from electronic tracking devices (the
"I am here" signals) are not protected as "electronic communications.,,192
Second, the ECPA added a section (§ 3117) which both defines electronic
tracking devices and provides for roving warrants to use such devices outside

188. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (DEA agents repeatedly called
a drug dealer's cellular telephone in order to generally locate the suspect within a wide metropolitan area.).
189. 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
190. See id.
191. However, once a license plate number is connected with an individual, the privacy of the
identification information is protected under Driver's Privacy Protection Act, discussed, infra. So far, courts
in the United States have not yet considered the legality of pervasively tracking vehicle license plate
numbers in an effort to track the whereabouts of a targeted individual or individuals. Since the technology
to accomplish such tracking is available, use of it to follow the movements of individuals, as well as to
identify people whose vehicles were in the vicinity of a particular location, such as a crime scene, is
inevitable. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in the fall of 200 I, after the World Trade Center
and Pentagon terrorist attacks, authorizes law enforcement access to a variety of facilities, including license
plate readers, and records from them.
192. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12)(C) (2001).
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the jurisdiction of the court authorizing installation of such a device. 193
Subsequent court decisions, discussed above, have held that this statute does
not limit the use of electronic tracking devices, but rather authorizes courts to
expand their geographical scope. 194
State Law Regarding Tracking People on Public Roads

State court decisions are divided on whether a warrant is required to
authorize law enforcement use of tracking devices. Some state courts have
outright rejected the federal open-to-observation standard in evaluating the
legality of law enforcement use of tracking devices. For example, in 1988, the
Oregon Supreme Court concluded that "use of the radio transmitter [beeper]
to locate defendant's automobile was a search .... Because the police did not
have a warrant to use the transmitter, and because no exigency obviated the
need to obtain a warrant, use of the transmitter violated defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9" of the Oregon Constitution. 195 According to the
Oregon Supreme Court, the principle that underlies the Oregon Constitution's
prohibition against unreasonable searches requires a determination "whether
the [beeper] practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government,
will significantly impair 'the people's' freedom from scrutiny.,,196 The
Oregon Court continued,
[N]o movement, no location and no conversation in a "public place"
would in any measure be secure from the prying of the government.
There would in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascertain when they were being scrutinized and when they were not. That
is nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom.197
For the Oregon court, unchecked law enforcement discretion to electronically
track people on roadways would result in too much government power over
individuals. It was therefore illegal without a warrant.
In contrast, in 2002 the Supreme Court of Nevada approved the
warrantless use of an electronic tracking device in a serial rape investigation
that led to conviction the defendant's conviction of several offenses, including
sex offenses, but not rape. The Nevada Supreme Court flatly concluded,
"[W]e can see no objective expectation of privacy in the exterior of an auto-

193. 18 U.S.C. § 3117.
194. United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753 (D. C. Cir. 2(00).
195. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988).
196. ld. at 1048.
197. /d. at 1049. The Supreme Court of Washington agreed that a warrant was necessary in State v.
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2(03), but found that warrants had been secured in that case.ld.
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mobile,"198 and followed the federal open-to-observation approach. The
Nevada Supreme Court might have ruled differently, had it agreed with the
Oregon Supreme Court that the issue should not be framed in narrow terms of
reasonable expectations of privacy, but ratherin terms of the consequences of
allowing too much power over individuals to be at the discretion of law
enforcement agencies. Protecting the rights of citizens against government
scrutiny, by requiring a warrant in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing, is an effective way to restrain that power and discretion. But the
Nevada Supreme Court was willing to tolerate greater societal control over
individuals in the form of law enforcement discretion to use electronic
tracking devices.
.
Some states have enacted specific legislation that restricts the use of
tracking-devices. As will be discussed more fully below, at least a half dozen
states have specific statutes regulating the use of tracking devices. Several of
these tracking device statutes, such as legislation in Oregon, Pennsylvania and
Utah, establish a court order procedure for the installation and use of tracking
devices by law enforcement. But they do not otherwise restrict the use of such
devices. Other tracking device statutes, including those enacted by California,
Hawaii, Tennessee and Texas sharply restrict the use of such devices,
especially for purposes other than law enforcement.
Each statute is somewhat different from the others. A typical state statute
is California Penal Code section 637.7, which broadly prohibits "use [of] an
electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a
person," 199 without the consent of the registered owner of the vehicle on which
the tracking device is installed. In enacting this criminal statute, the
California legislature found and declared "that the right to privacy is fundamental in a free and civilized society and that the increasing use of electronic
surveillance devices is eroding personal liberty . The Legislature declares that
electronic tracking of a person's location without that person's knowledge
violates that person's reasonable expectation of privacy.,,200 As originally
introduced, the proposed legislation prohibited law enforcement use of electronic tracking devices; but, as enacted, the statute contains several exceptions, including one for "the lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a
law enforcement agency.,,201 The statute defines an "electronic tracking
device" as "any device attached to a vehicle or other movable thing that
reveals its location or movement by the transmission of electronic signals."202

198. Osburn v. State. 44 P.3d 523. 526 (Nev. 2(02).
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(a) (West 1999).
200. 1998 Cal. Stat. 499. §1.
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(c).
202. [d. § 637.7(d).
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In addition to prosecution for a misdemeanor, violations of this statute can be
grounds for the revocation of the business licence (e.g. that of a private
investigator) of a person or entity illegally using such a device. There are no
reported decisions construing California Penal Code section 637.7, although
there are occasional press reports of arrests under this statute. 203 The broad
reach of the California tracking device statute potentially applies not only to
conventional beepers and GPS devices, but also to almost any kind of device
that tracks the location of a person or vehicle from one place to another. Even
tracking the location of a person through cell phone signals or the DSRC on. board units recently approved by the FCC are potentially within the reach of
this statute. 204
Moreover, other types of state statutes also affect the legality under state
law of tracking people on public roads. Many of these statutes do not specifically focus on roadway surveillance, although they may apply in the roadway
context. Perhaps the most obvious examples are stalking statutes, which may
authorize damage actions as well as establish criminal liability for stalking.
Most states have statutes that prohibit stalking. For example, California Civil
Code section 1708.7 creates a damage liability for following, alarming or
harassing a person who, as a result, fears for his or her safety or that of the
person's family. 205 The Civil Code provision requires that the defendant have
made credible threats with the intent to cause fear .. This statute includes threatening by use of electronic communications-known as "cyberstalking.,,206
The counterpart criminal statute is California Penal Code section 646.9, that
describes a similar crime of stalking. 207 Such statutes can be used against
those who physically follow other people, and could also be applied if on-road
surveillance or telematics systems are used to harass or frighten a victim.

Tort Liability for Interference with Privacy On the Open Road
When people track other people on public roads, tort liability is also
possible. 208 Although decided cases with regard to such tort liability are fairly

203. Police Arrest Suspect in Stalking of Woman, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2001, at A16. The article
describes the arrest of a 42-year-old man for stalking and unlawfully using an electronic tracking device
on a woman's car. The suspect was arrested "after a report of a someone tampering with a car. Officers
found a sophisticated tracking device attached to the bottom of the vehicle, police said." ld.
204. See discussion, supra note 59.
205. SeeCALCIV.COOE§ 1708.7 (West 1998).
206. See id. § 1708.7(b)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
207. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9. Ohio statutes contain even more extensive provisions regarding the
crime of Menacing by Stalking. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (Anderson 1996).
208. The origins of common law protection for privacy in the United States date back to a famous
1890 law review article, The Right to Privacy, largely written by Louis Brandeis, later a United States
Supreme Court Justice. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 205. The article described invasion of
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few and far between, tort law may apply to vindicate on-the-road privacy,
particularly when some of the more advanced tracking technologies discussed
in this article are used. Among the distinctive aspects of privacy tort actions
is the feature that defendants do not have to have committed a physical
trespass onto the plaintiffs property to be liable for invasion of privacy. A
person does not necessarily have to be in a private or secluded place to sue for
invasion of privacy. Nor is a privacy tort plaintiff required to be aware of the
defendant's wrongful actions at the time an invasion of privacy takes place.
As a result, the fact that the plaintiff was on a public road, or has not been
physically touched by the defendant, or perhaps does not even know about the
defendant at the time of the intrusion, does not foreclose liability for invasion
of privacy.
Indeed, defendants can be found liable for invading privacy of someone
on a public road under each of the four categories of privacy torts outlined in
the Restatement, Second, of Torts: 209
•
•
•
•

Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, commonly referred to as
"Intrusion,,,2\0
Appropriation of another's name or likeness, commonly referred
to as "Appropriation,,,211
Unreasonable Publicity given to another's private life, commonly referred to as "Public Disclosure,,,212 and
Publicity unreasonably placing another person in a false light,
commonly referred to as "False Light.,,213

The most likely tort actions for invasion of privacy by tracking someone on
public roads and highways would be for intrusion and for appropriation of
name or likeness.
The other two types of invasion of privacy torts-public disclosure 214 and

privacy as interference with an individual's "inviolate personality" and argued that the common law should
allow damage actions to redress and punish invasions of privacy. See id. at 198, 205. See also Glancy,
supra note 99, at 21-28.
209. REsTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1997) (adopted by the American Law
Institute). These four privacy torts are "personal" in the sense that only the living individual whose privacy
has been invaded has the right to bring a lawsuit based on them. [d. § 6521. Privacy tort actions are
generally limited by absolute and conditional privileges similar to those applicable in defamation actions,
such as consent and First Amendment protection for freedom of expression. [d. §§ 652F-652G. In most
cases involving these privacy torts, liability requires the privacy invasion to have been unreasonable.
210. [d. § 652B.
211. [d. § 652C.
212. REsTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS § 652D.
213. [d. § 652E.
214. "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of the kind that (a) would be highly
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false light215_are unlikely to be applicable in many roadway surveillance
cases. Both require widespread publicity, not just disclosure or publication
to another person as required under the law of defamation. Because both of
these privacy torts contemplate media defendants, both are also sharply
limited by First Amendment rights. The viability of tort actions against media
defendants for public disclosure of private facts is especially questionable
after Florida Star v. B.J.F.216 in which the United States Supreme Court made
it practically impossible to succeed in such a suit against a media defendant.
Similarly, the false light privacy tort has for a long time been on the short list
of endangered torts, primarily because publication of false information is
actionable as defamation. 217

Intrusion
The intrusion privacy tort can vindicate a person's seclusion or reserve,
even when the person is on a public road. The Restatement describes liability
for "Intrusion Upon Seclusion:"
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is

offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." ld. § 652D. It is
possible to imagine cases in which publicity regarding a person's travel patterns collected by traffic
surveiJIance might be actionable. But such actions would be unlikely to be successful because disclosure
of infonnation about a person's on-the-road activities is unlikely to be "highly offensive" to a reasonable
person. For example, the broadcast of private toll account records showing twice-a-day trips over a
particular bridge into another state might constitute a public disclosure of private facts. But just the leaking
of the toll records, without publicity about them, would not constitute a public disclosure of private facts,
even if the disclosure were highly offensive. Were a newspaper to publish a story containing the records,
that would probably be protected as First Amendment activity, unless the story were false. If the feature
story were false, then defamation might provide a surer remedy than invasion of privacy.
215. "One who gives pUblicity to a matter considering another that places the other before the public
in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which
the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of
or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed." ld. § 652E. One of the early United States Supreme Court decisions approving this aspect
of the privacy tort involved a newspaper report of bridge disaster in which a highway fell into a chasm.
Cantrell v. Forest City PubJ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
One can imagine a case in which a toll tag or license plate recognition system showed a pattern
of frequent travel by a car belonging to a religious leader or prominent citizen to and from an area of town
known for prostitution or drug sales. The vehicle or toll tag had been used by someone other than the
religious leader or prominent citizen. If later, a feature story described the .religious leader or prominent
citizen as a "known frequenter of the red-light district," such a story could be characterized as a false light
invasion of privacy, as well as defamatory.
216. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
217. Diane LeenheerZimmennan, False Light lnvasionofPrivacy: The Light That Failed, 64N.Y.U.
L. REV. 364 (1989).
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subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 218
This form of invasion of privacy is distinct from other forms of tortious
invasion of privacy, because liability for intrusion does not depend on use of
information. Rather, it involves interference with autonomy privacy interests.
What makes a defendant liable for intrusion is that the defendant has
"invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or
affairs.,,219 Although the Restatement's discussion of intrusion tends to focus
on private places, such as the home,220 the private seclusion vindicated by this
tort is not limited only to the home. The tort explicitly includes protection for
the seclusion of people out on the open road: "Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or
lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be
invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.,,221 The
intrusion privacy tort enforces respect for matters that the particular individual
reasonably considers personal and secluded. It is important to note that
"unless the interference with the plaintiffs seclusion is a substantial one, of
a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man," there
is no liability for intrusion. 222 Moreover, consent can also be a determinative
issue in intrusion cases.223
Court decisions have recognized that people on public roadways have
rights to vindicate intrusions on their privacy. Perhaps the most famous of
these intrusion decisions is GaZella v. Onassis224 in which a federal district
court granted injunctive relief against a celebrity photographer (self-described
as a "paparazzo," named after an annoying insect) who had followed, photographed and harassed Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her children in public
places such as streets, sidewalks and pathways. Ultimately, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals modified the injunction so as not to interfere with
proper news coverage of the late President's wife and children. 225 But the

218. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 652B.
219. [d. cmt. c.
220. For example. the comment notes that wrongful intrusion does not ordinarily extend to observing
or even taking the photograph of a plaintiff "while he is walking on the public highway. since he is not then
in seclusion. and his appearance is public and open to the public eye." [d.
221. [d. The illustration provided for the latter point is a photograph taken in an amusement house
of a young woman whose skirts have been blown over her head by a concealed jet of compressed air. [d.
illus.7.
222. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 6528 cm!. d.
223. [d. § 652F cm!. b.
224. Galella v. Onassis. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) modified by 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
225. Galella v. Onassis. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). The modified injunction continued to prohibit
approaching with in twenty-five feet of Mrs. Onassis "blocking of her movement in public places and
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district court's finding of tortious intrusion on Mrs. Onassis and her children
in public settings as an appropriate basis for injunctive relief remained unaffected. Even though she chose to go out on the open road with her family,
Mrs. Onassis did not impliedly consent to Galella's intrusions on her privacy.
An earlier court decision based on intrusion protected the public
activities of Ralph Nader. In Naderv. General Motors Corp. ,226 the New York
Court of Appeals upheld against a motion to dismiss, Ralph Nader's complaint
that agents of General Motors shadowed and kept him under surveillance, both
physical and electronic, tracking him as he moved about on public roads and
in public places. The court noted, "A person does not automatically make
public everything he does merely by being in a public place ....,,227 These
cases, and others like them, stand for the proposition that persons in public
settings, such as roadways, retain privacy rights vindicated by the intrusion
tort.
Fairly egregious facts tend to characterize cases in which plaintiffs have
prevailed in intrusion privacy actions arising out of public roadway settings.
After all, to be actionable under the Restatement, an intrusion must be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person." For example, in Wolfson v. Lewis,228 a
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against television
reporters who shadowed the family of executives of a healthcare insurer. 229
Surveillance took the forms of closely following automobiles in which the
executives or their families went to school or to work, and of using remote
cameras, parabolic microphones and the like. The potential for violence, as
security and safety fears mounted, prompted the judge to describe the
defendants' actions as "hounding, harassing, intimidating and frightening conduct. ,,230 The court expressed particular concern about the "intrusion upon
seclusion ... by electronic means such as wiretapping, photography or the use
ofbinoculars.,,231 The fact that the intrusions had taken place in public did not
undercut the plaintiffs's claims based on invasion of privacy by intrusion.
In a somewhat different type of case, Hidey v. Ohio State Highway
Patrol,232 an Ohio Court of Appeals found a viable intrusion upon seclusion

thoroughfares." and any actions that would put her health and safety in jeopardy or would be likely "to
harass. alann or frighten" her. [d. at 998.
226. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
227. [d. at 771. The court noted that there would be no intrusion into plaintiff s "private sphere"
when "the plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal that fact to any casual observer." [d. Activities and
details not observable by casual observers were subject to legal protection against intrusion.
228. 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
229. [d.
230. [d. at 1433.
231. [d. at 1434.
232. 689 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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privacy claim on the part of a female passenger asked to leave a vehicle that
had been stopped for speeding alongside an interstate highway. While the
passenger stood along side the highway, the officer shined a flashlight down
the front and back of her pants and then told her to partially disrobe in the
back of the cruiser. The court ruled that, "What is underneath her clothing is
private and a part of appellant's seclusion. The intrusion upon these private
matters, especially while on the side of an interstate highway, would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person ... ."233 To the extent that routine traffic
surveillance, whether by cameras or other electronic equipment, results in
similar outrageous exposure, the tort of intrusion may well apply to vindicate
the privacy of people along public roads and highways.
One of the most interesting recent decisions upholding liability for
intrusion in a highway setting is Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc.234 The case
involved several types of privacy claims brought by automobile accident
victims who, without their consent, were featured in a television report about
the accident in which the plaintiffs were very badly injured. Although the
decision in the case is complicated by multiple opinions and shifting
majorities, the majority opinion's discussion of the intrusion tort "expresses
the views of a majority of the court's members."235 In finding that, "It is in the
intrusion cases that invasion of privacy is most clearly seen as an affront to
individual dignity,,,236 the majority opinion quoted at length from the late
Professor Edward Bloustein, who had warned,
"[A] measure of personal isolation and personal control over the
conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal
freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts. . .. He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of
the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant. ,,237
Although the court did not consider the accident scene (a ravine off the highway) to be private, the court found "two triable issues of intrusion on
seclusion.,,238 First, the court found an "objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy" with regard to the interior of the rescue helicopter, which the court
analogized to an ambulance or hospital room. 239 Second, the court found a
protectable privacy interest in the conversations between one of the accident
victims and medical rescuers. Noting that there are no bright lines with regard

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

[d. at 93.
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
[d. at 475 n.2.
[d. at 489.
[d. (quoting Bloustein, supra note 100, at 973-74).
[d. at 490.
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490.

HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 358 2004

2004]

OPEN ROAD

359

to such questions, the court held that the determination whether news gatherers
"acted with highly offensive disrespect for ... personal privacy" in intrusion
cases should be determined by juries in California. 240
In a later case involving intrusion, a unanimous decision of the California
Supreme Court approved protection of privacy expectations against intrusion
in another type of public setting, an office. 24I The court emphasized two
required elements for an intrusion cause of action: "( 1) intrusion into a private
place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable
person."242 The first element requires that a plaintiff have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, but does not require such a privacy expectation to be
"of absolute or complete privacy.,,243 The court explained that for the
purposes of the intrusion tort, there can be enforceable expectations of limited
privacy in public settings. The court explained that privacy "is not a binary,
all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one
expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the
expectation unreasonable as a matter of law.,,244
Quoting from Professor Thomas McCarthy, the court noted that, '''Like
'privacy,' the concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that a person
can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally
be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone. ",245 The court noted that
determining whether an area is one of limited seclusion is properly a factual
issue for a jury or other fact-finder to decide. In intrusion cases, "the
reasonableness of a person's expectation of visual and aural privacy depends
not only on who might have been able to observe the subject interaction, but
on the identity of the claimed intruder and the means of intrusion."246 The
court also noted that, "We do not suggest that the same standards necessarily
apply to private intrusions as to government searches, or vice versa.,,247
According to the California Supreme Court, the notion of reasonable privacy
expectations in tort law is distinct from the contentious reasonable expectation
of privacy concepts under federal search and seizure law.
Whether routine surveillance of activities along public roads would rise

240. [d. at 494-95.
241. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (involving an investigative reporters use of a hidden
microphone and camera in investigating a telepsychic business from inside the offices of that business).
242. [d. at 71.
243. [d.
244. [d. at 72.
245. [d. (quoting THOMASJ.McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10(A)(2) (2d
ed. West Group 2(00)).
246. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 77.
247. [d. at 74 n.3.
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to the level of tortious intrusion is uncertain. What is likely is that intrusion
cases brought in California will often withstand demurrer and summary
judgment motions. They are likely to be ultimately decided by juries in
California. Particularly egregious factors, such as using a traffic surveillance
camera to capture activities in buildings adjacent to the roadway or to peer
into vehicles and perhaps look at a driver's clothing or lack thereof, or at the
emotional state of passengers in vehicles or at the text of their reading
materials, could be types of roadway surveillance that might well result in
liability. Under the standards established for intrusion actions by the California Supreme Court, it would be up to ajury to decide whether the context was
sufficiently private and whether the intrusion was highly offensive.
Appropriation

Privacy rights to prevent appropriation of an individual's name or
likeness 248 can apply to people in vehicles. In Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco CO.,249 the Ninth Circuit held that legal protection for "an
individual's proprietary interest in his own identity," was available when a
cigarette company used distinctive features of a famous race car driver's
vehicle in a television commercial for cigarettes without the car owner's
permission. 250 Even though the appearance of the race car was slightly altered,
its distinguishing features were still apparent. These features caused viewers .
to believe that the car was being driven by the celebrity race car driver, who
was in fact in the car when the altered photograph was taken but was not
visible in the photograph.
When vehicles, or their travel patterns, are similarly associated with
particular persons, and such things are used for advertizing purposes, there
appears to be potential liability for the appropriation of personal identity.
Most of the reported court decisions regarding tort liability for invasion of
privacy by appropriation involve commercial use of a person's name or
likeness in advertising. For example, liability for appropriation might result
from the image of a vehicle driver or perhaps of a bicyclist or pedestrian,
captured by a remote camera or photo radar, when the image was later used
in commercial advertizing without the consent of the person involved.
The law enforcement surveillance systems described above are not now
used to collect or to distribute information for advertizing purposes. But some
of the advanced ITS technologies, particularly those involving vehicles
equipped with location devices and on-board communication units, make it

248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 652C.
249. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
250. [d. at 825.
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possible to collect a data image of an individual's movements and decisions,
sometimes called a user profile. Such a data profile has substantial
commercial value. Because these data images or user profiles of travel
patterns are extremely valuable for marketing purposes, there have been a
number of suggestions for applying the appropriation privacy tort to data
collection. 2S1 For example, Professor Andrew McClug has made an extended
argument for applying the appropriation privacy tort in situations involving
dossiers of consumer data, data mining and consumer profiling. 252 He
suggests focusing on appropriation rights that vindicate the identity and
personal dignity rights of non-famous ordinary individuals. After all these
appropriation cases vindicate interference with individual self-determination,
and are fundamentally different from the property-based actions that vindicate
celebrities's ownership of their publicity rights. 253 In the non-celebrity cases,
individual identity and dignity rights can be vindicated by the appropriation
privacy tort. 2S4 Such rights associated with autonomy privacy interests can
also be infringed by mass data collection, data mining and consumer profiling.
Such appropriation privacy tort protections may also apply to the personal
travel patterns of individuals captured by advanced roadway tracking systems
described in this article. Legislative recognition that ordinary individuals have
such privacy rights that include proprietary control over information about

251. Recent scholarly writing asserts ownership of information derived from individuals. For
example, in The Architecture of Privacy, Professor Lawrence Lessig maintains that people own data of
which they are the subject, or source. Lawrence Lessig. The Architecture of Privacy, I V AND. J. ENT. L.
& PRAC. 56 (1999). His widely-acclaimed book, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, makes a
similar argument. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE (1999). However, aside
from particular legislation requiring individual consent to the use of certain types of information about a
person and tort rights protecting the publicity rights of celebrities, United States law has up to now not often
recognized such ownership theories. Other academic lawyers, such as Professor Pamela Samuelson. have
argued that control over information about a person is better protected through a licensing system, similar
to that which applies regard to trade secrets. See Pamela Samuelson. Privacy as Intellectual Property?,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (2000). Even academic speculation has tended to stop short of asserting privacy
rights to refuse participation in anonymous data collection. See also Janet Dean Gertz. Comment, The
Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 943 (2002);
Jessica Litman, Information Privacyflnformation Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283 (2000).
252. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 63 (2003).
253. The United States Supreme Court approved such an appropriation right for a person who
performed a human canon ball act in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See,
e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.NJ. 1981).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 652C explains in comment b that appropriation
liability "is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the
plaintiff s name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one,
and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS. supra note 209, § 652C cm!. b. Three of the illustrations involve impersonation. See id. iIIus.
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their driving patterns is evidenced in the vehicle "black box" legislation
discussed below. 255
State Constitutional Privacy Guarantees
Aside from protections against unreasonable searches and seizures256
discussed above, Federal Constitutional law does not offer general privacy
protections against roadway surveillance. Nor has the United States Constitution been applied to restrict gathering or use of personal information. 257 However, state constitutional law is quite different. In fact, some state constitutions offer important protections for the privacy of people on the open road.
About ten state constitutions contain provisions expressly guaranteeing a right
of privacy.258 Other state constitutions have been interpreted to contain an
implied privacy right. 259 Many of these state constitutional privacy protections
apply to both public and private sector entities,260 as well as to both collectors
and transferees of personal information. So far, these specific constitutional
privacy guarantees have not yet been applied to tracking people on roadways,
although state constitutional restrictions against unreasonable searches and
seizures are the basis for restricting the use of tracking devices discussed
above.26I
It may be useful to point out that at least one type of out-in-the-open
roadway-related activity has been protected by some state constitutional
privacy rights. That activity is leaving trash on the curbside for removal by
sanitation workers .. The United States Supreme Court does not recognize
privacy rights in trash left on the curbside to be removed by refuse
collectors. 262 But several state supreme courts have protected such privacy
rights as a matter of state constitutional privacy law. 263 These cases might be
extended from trash on the roadside to cars on the roadway, for example,
when remote highway sensors are used to collect data about vehicle tailpipe
emissions.

255. See discussion infra note 322.
256. See text discussion supra notes 130-66.
257. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
258. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, llIinois, Louisiana, Montana,
South Carolina, and West Virginia.
259. These states include Arkansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and perhaps Iowa.
260. The Alaska, California, Hawaii, llIinois, and Louisiana constitutions provide that their privacy
guarantees apply to private-sector as well as public-sector invasions of privacy.
261. See discussion supra notes 195-97.
262. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
263. The states in which state constitutional privacy rights protect privacy in these circumstances
inciudeCalifomia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington, and perhaps Indiana, where the interrnediateappellate
courts are divided on the issue.
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The California constitutional protection for privacy was among the
earliest of these state constitutional privacy provisions. For over thirty years,
the Constitution of the State of California has explicitly guaranteed an
"inalienable right to privacy" in Article I, § 1. This constitutional privacy right
was adopted in a 1972 initiative campaign in which concerns about collection
and misuse of infonnation about individuals were prominent reasons for the
measure's adoption. Because under California law ballot arguments are used
to interpret legislative intent with regard to initiative measures, it is useful to
consider the potential application of this constitutional privacy right to
collection and use of infonnation about people's activities on the open road:
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. . .. It prevents
government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling
unnecessary infonnation about us and from misusing infonnation
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass us. . . . The average citizen also does not have control over
what infonnation is collected about him. Much is secretly collected
. . .. Modem technology is capable of monitoring, centralizing and
computerizing this infonnation which eliminates any possibility of
individual privacy. [California's Constitutional privacy right is
designed to] prevent misuse of this infonnation for unauthorized
purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous
infonnation. 264
Under this Constitutional provision, both public-sector and private-sector
interferences with privacy are lawful only if they are justified by a very
important societal interest. Whether combating traffic congestion, or collecting travel patterns of everyone who takes a certain route, or locating potential
terrorist suspects would qualify as such very important societal interests has
not yet been decided.
No reported decision has directly addressed the application of this
constitutional privacy right to roadway surveillance. But the California
Supreme Court has enforced this constitutional privacy right in the context of
surveillance of public activities. In White v. Davis265 the California Supreme
Court upheld a taxpayer's complaint, brought under California Civil
Procedure Code section 526a, seeking an injunction against expenditure of
public funds for covert police surveillance of university classes and other

264.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION- PROPOS mONS AND PROPOSED LAws TOGETHER

WITH ARGUMENTS - GENERAL ELECflON, TuESDAY, NOVEMBER

7, 1972, at 27, 28.

265. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
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public activities at the University of California at Los Angeles. 266 Justice
Tobriner presented the case as raising two questions:
[First:] Do the state and federal Constitutions pennit police officers,
posing as students, to enroll in a major university and engage in the
covert practice of recording class discussions, compiling police
dossiers and filing "intelligence" reports, so that the police have
"records" on the professors and students? [Second:] Is this "intelligence gathering" by the police covering discussions in university
classes and in public and private meetings of university-sponsored
organizations, constitutionally valid when such reports "pertain to no
illegal activity or acts?,,267
The answer to each of these questions was a resounding "no." Only a showing
of compelling state interest could justify such a surveillance regime.
Perhaps the court's sharp reaction to the surveillance in White was
affected by factual allegations that included: "extensive, routine, covert police
surveillance of university classes and organization meetings" that the court
described as "unprecedented in our nation's history."268 But the court also
pointed to "routine stationing of covert, undercover police agents in university
classrooms and association meetings, both public and private." The Court
held that such routine surveillance "constitutes 'government snooping' in the
extreme.,,269 Since it was alleged "that the information gathered by the undercover agents from class discussion and organization meetings 'pertains to no
illegal activity or acts, '" the court sunnised "that the gathered material,
preserved in 'police dossiers,' may be largely unnecessary for any legitimate
. . . governmental interest.,,270 Whether similar covert collection of
information (e.g., dossiers in the form of itineraries) of law-abiding people on
the open road would evoke a similar response has yet to be decided.
In a later decision interpreting the California state constitutional privacy
guarantee, the court reaffirmed that the California constitutional right to
privacy applies broadly to all sorts of both governmental and nongovernmental
actors-Big Brother and Big Sister from the public sector, as well as the littlebrothers from the private sector. In Hill v. NCAA,27 1 the California Supreme
Court sharply distinguished the circumstances in White and ruled that most
California state constitutional privacy actions against nongovernmental

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

[d. at 226.
[d. at 224.
[d. at 235.
[d. at 234.
White, 533 P.2d at 234.
865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (upholding drug testing of student athletes under an NCAA anti-drug

program).
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privacy invasions simply require a balancing of competing societal interests.
The California Supreme Court also provided guidance for such balancing in
outlining the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the state
constitutional right to privacy: "(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by
defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.,,272 The decision also
recognizes defenses to this cause of action in the form of competing interests
that derive from "legally authorized and socially beneficial activities of
government and private entities."m Enforcing the California constitutional
right to privacy can present a fairly daunting task for plaintiffs who seek to
fulfill each of these requirements.
With regard to showing a legally protected privacy interest, it is useful
to bear in mind that the California Supreme Court explained in Hill, supra:
Whatever their common denominator, privacy interests are best
assessed separately and in context. Just as the right to privacy is not
absolute, privacy interests do not encompass all conceivable
assertions of individual rights. Legally recognized privacy interests
are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information
("informational privacy"); and (2) interests in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without
observation, intrusion, or interference ("autonomy privacy").274
As noted above, roadway surveillance potentially affects both types oflegally
protected privacy interests. These interests involve both information privacy
interests in precluding misuse of information regarding one's location, as well
as autonomy interests in not having one's activities on the road scrutinized and
information about them collected without one's consent. The court in White
was particularly concerned about the ways in which surveillance of public
activities affects autonomy interests and can affect, and sometimes chill,
personal decisions.
In the context of ITS, information collected by roadway surveillance in
the form of anonymous traffic flow information used in traffic management
does not involve personally identifiable information at all. Such information
only becomes personally identifiable when it is associated with a vehicle
owner through a vehicle license plate or a toll tag identifier. A comprehensive
data could of course connect an identified individual's itineraries with other
types of information about the individual -- such as name, address, social

272. [d. at 675.
273. [d. at 656.
274. [d. at 654.

HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 365 2004

366

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

security number, purchases with credit cards, law enforcement information,
other locations visited, and information about associates. In such circumstances, the California state constitution would probably be interpreted to
recognize a much stronger privacy interest.
Second, under Hill, a cause of action for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy also requires a reasonable expectation of privacy under
the circumstances. As, the California Supreme Court explained in Hill, "A
'reasonable' expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on
broadly based and widely accepted community norms.'>275 Among the
"customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities"
that "create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy," the court notes
particularly "the presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily
to activities impacting privacy interests.,,276 As a result, the open circumstances of travel on public roads might appear to signify a sort of implied
waiver of privacy expectations. 277 And yet even though most travel activities
on the open road are open to observation, constitutionally protected expectations of privacy have been protected even in relatively open places. For
example, in a public university in White 278 and in a public office in Sanders,279
the impact of the surveillance on individual privacy was determined to be too
great.
The third element of a cause of action for interference with the California
state constitutional right to privacy requires that, "Actionable invasions of
privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or
potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms
underlying the privacy right.',280 As the California Supreme Court noted in
Hill, "No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of
private action, no matter how slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for
invasion of privacy.,,281 With regard to roadway surveillance, social norms
regarding collection of information about individuals are only beginning to
emerge. In some cases, such as roadway stops, the norms seem to be clear.
But in other types of cases, particularly with regard to technologically
advanced surveillance that tracks people on public roadways, the public norms

275. [d. at 655.
276. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.

277. For example, in People v. Stanley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the District Court
of Appeal held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the amount of electricity entering a
person's home that was measured surreptitiously by a box installed by the electric company on a public
utility pole outside the defendant's house. [d.
278. White, 533 P.2d at 222.
279. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (also an intrusion privacy tort action).
280. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
281. [d.
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are much less clear. One source of privacy norms applicable to roadway
surveillance would be the privacy principles of the Intelligent Transportation
Society of America discussed above.282
Even when a cause of action for interference with the state constitutional
right to privacy has satisfied the above three elements, there remains an
opportunity to again balance privacy interests against competing societal
interests. This balancing occurs through the defenses discussed at length in
Hill:

The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the privacy right
necessarily requires that privacy interests be specifically identified
and carefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and
nonprivacy interests in a "balancing test." The comparison and
balancing of diverse interests is central to the privacy jurisprudence
of both common and constitutional law .283
Various types of roadway surveillance would involve balancing different
competing societal purposes: Law enforcement roadway surveillance systems
serve traffic 'and law enforcement purposes. ITS traffic management systems
serve such societal interests as traffic safety, environmental protection, as well
as preventing traffic congestion. Some of the private-sector telematics
systems may serve less weighty societal interests, such as consumer
convenience, advertising and the like. Such interests would be balanced along
with the privacy interests in determining whether there is too much societal
control over the individual.
Two related factors - lack of choice and government coercion - tend to
tip the balance toward a finding of unconstitutional privacy interference. The
California Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted on the importance of choice:
If, for example, a plaintiff claiming a violation of the state

constitutional right to privacy was able to choose freely among
competing public or private entities in obtaining access to some
opportunity, commodity, or service, his or her privacy interest may
weigh less in the balance. In contrast, if a public or private entity
controls access to a vitally necessary item, it may have a
correspondingly greater impact on the privacy rights of those with
whom it deals. 284
When ITS traffic management systems collect origin-destination data without
the knowledge or consent of the person being tracked, the person is deprived

282. See discussion supra note 107.
283. Hill. 865 P.2d at 655.
284. Id. at 657.
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of any choice. On the other hand, if drivers can choose to travel toll roads
anonymously, as is the case with regard to certain Canadian toll roads,285
choice is restored. When travelers are informed about the collection of origindestination data and given the opportunity to consent or not to the use of data
about their travels, privacy interferences are mitigated. Moreover, the
California Supreme Court has expressed repeated concern that "the pervasive
presence of coercive government power in basic areas of human life typically
poses greater dangers to the freedoms of the citizenry than actions by private
persons.,,286 When law enforcement agents surreptitiously attach a tracking
device to a vehicle, coercive government action causes increased concern
about privacy.
Aside from forming the basis for litigation against both public-sector and
private-sector invasions of privacy, the California Constitutional privacy
guarantee has also played a role in forestalling efforts to gain discovery of
personal location information. For example in Planned Parenthood Golden
Gate v. Superior Court, 287 Justice Haerle held that the state constitutional right
to privacy outweighed the interest in requiring disclosure of the names and
residential addresses of Planned Parenthood's staff and volunteers who were
not parties to the litigation. The litigation was over anti-abortion protestors's
rights to protest outside an abortion-provider's facility. The court found that
"a privacy interest does not need to be violated before it can be acknowledged .
. . . [R]ecent history teaches that the consequences of disclosure of private
In response to a
information about these individuals can be dire.,,288
suggestion that "individuals do not have strong privacy interests in their
residential addresses and telephone numbers because such information is
routinely disclosed during discovery and is often accessible by other means,"
Justice Haerle replied that in the particular context at issue there was "a very
. strong privacy interest in avoiding disclosure."289
As discussed above, all state constitutions specifically prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. In some instances courts have found state
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures to prohibit
use of electronic tracking devices without a warrant. 290 The Oregon Supreme
Court even found that the Oregon constitution protects "freedom from

285. See, e.g., 407 Toll Route: How You Can Travel the 407 Anonymously, Infonnation and Privacy
Commissioner website, at http://www.ipc.on.calscriptslindex_.asp?action=31&N_IO=I&P_1O=11353&U
_ID=O (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
286. Hill, 865 P.2d at 656.
287. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
288. [d. at 640.
289. [d. at 641, 643. In vacating the trial court's discovery order, the Court of Appeal even rejected
the use of a protective order with regard to private data identifying the location of individuals. [d. at 645.
290. See discussion supra notes 195-97.
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scrutiny.,,29I Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court concluded "that the
citizens of this State have a [constitutional] right to be free from the type of
governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a
citizen's vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances
in technology.,,292
.

Statutes Restricting Roadway Surveillance
Concerns about privacy on the open road have generated a remarkably
varied group of statutes that address particular privacy problems posed by
specific types of roadway surveillance. Categorizing these statutes is difficult
because the legislation tends to respond to particular concerns about potential
invasions of privacy by specific types of technology. Because federal statutes
apply more widely than the legislation of anyone state, it makes sense to first
discuss some of the relevant federal legislation and then tum to some of the
much more numerous and various state statutes.

Federal Statutes
The original legislation that established the Intelligent Transportation
Systems program required the program to be developed in light of concerns
about privacy. 293 The United States Department of Transportation, through
the Federal Highway Administration and the ITS Joint Program Office
continues to support and to fund ITS programs in the spirit of this mandate.
Not only is federal funding for ITS projects typically contingent on properly
taking account of privacy; in addition, the Intelligent Transportation Society
of America (formerly the designated advisory committee to the Department
of Transportation on ITS issues) developed the privacy principles noted earlier
which the Society recommends be followed by all of its members. 294 As a
result, recognition of privacy interests are woven into almost every aspect of
ITS programs.
At a more specific level, the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act295
(DPPA) restricts state departments of motor vehicles, and others who sell and
disclose information from state departments of motor vehicles databases, from
disclosing personal information about a driver without the driver's consent.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld this privacy mandate

291. State v. Campbell. 759 P.2d 1040. 1048 (Or. 1988)
292. State v. Jackson. 76 P.3d 217. 224 (Wash. 2003).
293. Pub. L. No. 102-240. 105 Stat. 2189. § 6054. See Nonnan Y. Mineta. Transportation.
Technology and Privacy. 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 3 (1995).
294. See discussion supra note 107.
295. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2001).
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against a federalism challenge based on the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
in Reno v. Condon. 296 The Supreme Court ruled that the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act was legislation of general application that "regulates the
universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle
information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate
commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in
commerce. ,,297
The DPPA restricts the availability of personal information identifying
an individual without the consent of the individual. Personal information
protected under the statute includes information that identifies an individual,
such as "an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code) telephone number,
and medical or disability information, but does not include information on
vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status.,,298 An even more
carefully protected category of "highly restricted personal information"
includes the "individual's photograph or image, social security number,
medical or disability information."299 Specific provisions restrict the use and
disclosure of such information both by state motor vehicle licensing
authorities and by those who use information derived from official driver's
license records. The DPPA specifically restricts reuse of information about
drivers that was collected for licensing purposes. Without the written consent
of the driver, information about a driver cannot be used for other purposes.
Passage of the statute was stimulated in part by notorious cases of stalkers
who murdered victims whose addresses had been obtained through requests
for DMV records. 3°O
In addition, federal electronic surveillance laws protect the content of
wireless communications to and from vehicles against unlawful interception.
Special procedures are established for law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to access these communications under specified circumstances. 301
The USA PATRIOT Act, noted above, has significantly expanded the ability
of law enforcement and intelligence agencies both to intercept the content of
communications through electronic surveillance and to access a wide variety

296. 528 U.s. 141 (2000).
297. Id. at 151.
298. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
299. Id § 2725(4).
300. According to Senator Barbara Boxer, The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-2725, was prompted by the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the hit television series,
"My Sister Sam." See 139 CONGo REc. S15745-01, 515762 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). But there
were other notorious cases as well. See also Ellen Barry, Killer's Dreams Bared on the Internet N.H. Man
Took to Web to Boast and to Stalk, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1999, at B I.
301. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
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of business records, such as those containing location information held by
communications providers.
Because the United States Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) that restrictions on electronic surveillance did not apply
when the government used a pen register to record numbers dialed from a
telephone, no warrant is required for similar interceptions of to-from
information in the context of wireless communications. Moreover, as noted
above, in 1986 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act exempted
electronic tracking devices from the restrictions on electronic surveillance in
18 U.S.c. § 2510 and added 18 U.S.c. § 3117 to specifically authorize courts
to permit use of electronic tracking devices beyond the court's geographical
jurisdiction. As noted earlier, this section places few restraints on the use of
electronic tracking devices and simply recognizes courts' authority to permit
the monitoring of these devices across jurisdictions.
The potential for tracking the locations of wireless communications
devices some of which are attached to or carried in vehicles, caused Congress
to require that automatic location identification (ALI) not be used for tracking
wireless communications device users, other than for emergency response
purposes. 302 A separate statute, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2522 and 47 U.S.c. §§ 229, 1001-1010,
facilitates law enforcement access to this location information. 303 Indeed,
Congressional concerns about potential misuse of automatic location identification (ALI) are reflected in 47 U.S.c. § 222 designed to protect the privacy
of location information obtained by wireless carriers. Federal law protects
this location information against disclosure by wireless carriers both generally
under § 222(a)304 as well as under § 222(c) as customer proprietary network
information (CPNI).305 However, the precise meaning of this privacy protection remains somewhat opaque after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down FCC rules interpreting the statute to require affirmative choice (opt-in)
by subscribers regarding disclosure of CPNI by wireless users in United States
West, Inc. v. FCC306
As federal telecommunications laws now stand, 47 U.S.c. § 222 governs
the privacy of cellular telephone customer information. The statute places a
duty on telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customer
information:

302. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2001).
303. Cell phone records have been successfully used as evidence in criminal cases. United States v.
Forest. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
304. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a).
305. [d. § 222(c).
306. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). em. denied. 530 U.S. 1213 (2000) (vacating on First
Amendment grounds a FCC orner restricting wireless carriers from using and disclosing CPNI).
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A telecommunications carrier that receives. or obtains [CPNI]
proprietary information from another carrier for purposes of providing
any telecommunications service shall use such information only for
such purpose, and shall not use such information for its own
marketing efforts. 307
With regard to wireless location information, 47U.S.C. § 222(f) requires
"express prior authorization of the customer" before "use or disclosure of or
access to-( 1) call location information concerning the user of a commercial
mobile service,,308 other than in accordance with emergency notification
services as provided under 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(4). Under 47U.S.C. §
222(h)(1) customer proprietary network information (CPNI) includes "information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination,
location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by
any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to
the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer
relationship. ,,309
However, under 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(3) "[a] telecommunications carrier
that receives or obtains customer proprietary network information by virtue
of its provision of a telecommunications service may use, disclose, or permit
access to aggregate customer information" for purposes other than provision
of telecommunications service or services necessary to the provision of such
service. 310 "Aggregate information" is defined in 47 U.S.c. § 222(h)(2) as
"collective data that relates toa group or category of services or customers,
from which individual customer identities and characteristics have been
removed.,,311 As a result of this complex legislation, location information is
routinely collected by wireless telecommunications providers. Access to this
information depends on the nature of the user, the consent of the wireless
subscriber and the purposes for which the location information is used.
The recently adopted FCC order allocating bandwidth for Dedicated
Short Range Communications in ITS Applications, discussed above,312 is
intended to facilitate inclusion of wireless radio communications devices in
new vehicles (OBUs) and installation of communications nodes along roadsides (RSUs). One could argue that, since these OBUs are wireless
telecommunications devices, that information from them should be treated in

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

47 U.S.C. § 222(b).
[d. § 222(f).
[d. § 222(h)(I).
[d. § 222(c)(3).
[d. § 222(h)(2).
See discussion supra note 59.
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the same way as location infonnation from wireless telephones which is
protected as CPNI. However, the new ITS Rule and Order, noted above, says
nothing about protecting the privacy of DSRC users. As a practical matter,
some of the DSRC technology, particularly the geographically limited standalone roadside units, might not be treated as interstate telecommunications
carriers under federal law and, as a result, not CPNI. In short, considerable
uncertainty remains about the privacy of the new ITS communications
applications.

State Legislation.

In contrast with the generally permissive federal laws regarding privacy
on roadways, state statutes designed to protect privacy on the open road tend
to offer more privacy protection, although there is considerable variation. For
example, the state statutes regulating electronic tracking devices discussed
above 313 offer considerably more protection for roadway privacy than
applicable federal statutes.
Several states have enacted legislation restricting photo radar and red
light cameras described above. 314 One of the first such statutes was" enacted
by New Jersey in 1992.315 The prohibition is direct and unequivocal: "Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, a law enforcement
officer or agency shall not use photo radar to enforce the provisions of [traffic
regulations] ..•. "316 The Utah statute's prohibition on photo radar is subject
to exceptions, such as allowing use of photo radar in school zones. The Utah
statute also requires posting of warning signs and requires local option before
radar is used.317 The Oregon statute only authorizes photo radar in seven
specified municipalities which can decide whether or not to use photo radar.
The Oregon statute also requires signs warning of the use of photo radar,
limited hours of use and a number of other restrictions.318 Nevertheless, photo
radar remains widely used in the United States, aside from the states where
these statutory restri~tions apply.

313. See discussion supra notes 200-03.
314. Five states appear to have statutes that specifically address the use of photo radar: California,
New Jersey, Utah, Wisconsin, and Oregon.
315. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103.1 (West 2002). California and Wisconsin also prohibit use of photo
radar in speed enforcement. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.6(c) (West 2(00); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.02(3)(b)
(West 2(00).
316. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103.1(a).
317. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-52.5 (1998).
318. OR. REV. STAT. § 810.438 (2003).
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Other state statutes address misuse of remote cameras. A California
statute has recently authorized an action for "constructive invasion of privacy"
under California Civil Code section 170S.S(b):
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial
activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory
enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass,
if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not
have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory
enhancing device was used.319
Using electronic devices to capture images of personal or family activities is
grounds for civil liability in California, even when there is no physical
trespass on the property of the victim. Misuse of remote cameras to probe the
interiors of apartments along the highway would appear to violate this statute.
Since the concept of constructive invasion of privacy protects all areas where
one has "a reasonable expectation of privacy," such areas could potentially
include the interiors of vehicles, particularly mobile homes, on the open road.
The most recent, and in many ways the most interesting, example of state
legislative restrictions on roadway surveillance technology is what is called
"black box" legislation restricting the availability of infonnation from the
computer diagnostic modules described, supra. 320 A recently enacted
California Statute, Vehicle Code section 9951 provides that any new motor
vehicle manufactured on or after July I, 2004 that is sold or leased in
California and is "equipped with one or more recording devices commonly
referred to as 'event data recorders (EDR)' or 'sensing and diagnostic modules
(SDM),' shall disclosure that fact in the owner's manual.,,32I The statute
covers devices that record such factors as the vehicle's speed and direction,
the history of where the vehicle has traveled, vehicle steering perfonnance,
use and perfonnance of breaks, or the driver's use (or not) of a seatbelt. It
also covers any device that has the capacity to transmit infonnation about an
accident in which the vehicle has been involved to a central receiving system
when an accident occurs.322 Such "black box" infonnation is routinely

319. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West Supp. 2004).
320. See discussion supra notes 45-49.
321. CAL. VEH. CODE § 995 1(a) (West Supp. 2004).
322. [d. § 9951(b).
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downloaded by insurance companies and vehicle manufacturers for use in
determining the causes of and liability for accidents.
The statute also restricts data derived from such devices. "Black box"
data cannot legally be downloaded or otherwise retrieved by anyone other than
the registered owner of the vehicle, except with the consent of the vehicle
owner. However, the data can be produced in response to a lawful court
order. It can also lawfully be used for motor vehicle safety research, provided
that the identity of the registered owner or driver are not disclosed.
Automotive technicians are permitted access to "black box" for the purposes
of servicing or repairing the vehicle, but are restricted from releasing the data.
The statute also specifically requires that telematics subscription services
(such as OnStar, discussed above) disclose their capacity to record or transmit
vehicle diagnostic information as part of their SUbscription services.
So far, California is the only state to establish that a vehicle owner or
driver is the owner of vehicle diagnostic information. To the extent that this
data-ownership model is extended to other types of information derived from
the activities of people on the open road, protection for the privacy interests
of roadway users will be further reinforced.
V. CONCLUSION
The principle that people on the open road have the right to control
information about their on-the-road activities underlies the recent California
Statute regarding onboard black box diagnostic units just discussed. Such a
principle also contributes to many of the other types of privacy rights
discussed in this article. Returning control over information about the
activities of people on public roads and highways to the individuals who are
the subjects of that information is an appropriate and effective strategy for
protecting autonomy and information privacy interests of people on the open
road.
Respect for the individual person and insistence on each person's rights
to dignity and self-determination underlie the laws that protect the privacy of
people on public roads and highways. These laws protect both autonomy
privacy rights concerned with where an individual can freely choose to go and
also information privacy rights to control collection and disclosure of
information collected about the individual's whereabouts.
A half-century ago, Justice William O. Douglas described privacy
interests as radiating out from the individual in concentric circles:
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression
of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.
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Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children.
Third is the freedom to care for one's health ~d person, freedom
from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf. 323
It is to this outer edge of privacy interests, that this article has directed
attention.
Out there on the open road, important privacy interests are worthy of
recognition and protection. Examining these outlying privacy interests in light
of advances in technologies designed to continuously keep track of everyone's
whereabouts spotlights some of the privacy rights that have been out there on
the open road all along, perhaps unseen and unappreciated.

323. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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